VI - REGULATION, SUPERVISION AND FINANCIAL STABILITY
Effective and non-disruptive regulation and supervision of the financial system in general and banking sector in
particular, is key to ensuring systemic financial stability. The Reserve Bank continued to maintain high standards
of regulation and supervision in line with the international norms. Adoption of Basel III norms, which envisages
complete implementation by commercial banks by end-March 2018 is one of the major steps in this direction.
Under these guidelines, the banks would be required to gradually increase their capital base over a period of
time. The banking sector remained robust with high capital adequacy, even though rising NPA levels emerged
as a concern. The NPAs, however, are pro-cyclical in nature and a rise in the same may be a reflection of overall
slowdown in the economy. The Reserve Bank has undertaken several initiatives like faster grievances redressal
mechanism, facilitating better banking experience for the disabled and intra-bank transfer of deposit facility to
benefit the common man.
VI.1 In the aftermath of the financial crisis, most
of the analytical reports and empirical research
pointed out absence of stringent regulation and
supervision of financial system as one of the major
factors which led to the crisis. Given the highly
interdependent and globalised nature of the modern
financial structure, problems which emanate in one
country soon turn into systemic crisis, which are
global in nature. In response to this experience, the
regulators have become proactive in adopting
regulations which ensure greater transparency,
better governance practices, larger role for central
banks in supervision and restricting growth of ‘toobig-
to-fail’ financial institutions. In the case of India,
the Reserve Bank, even before the outbreak of the
global financial crisis, has been proactively
implementing the prudential regulation policies. This
regulatory stance has been vindicated by the recent
developments. The Reserve Bank continued with
its policy of adopting the best international
regulatory policies, at the same time ensured that
excessive regulation does not hinder the natural
growth of the financial system, thereby putting
constraints to the growth aspirations of the
economy.
FINANCIAL STABILITY ASSESSMENT
VI.2 Pursuit of financial stability remained an
integral element of the Reserve Bank’s macrofinancial policy framework. The Reserve
Bank continued its efforts towards putting in place
a robust surveillance framework for the assessment
of systemic risks and in this direction, a series of
systemic risk assessment projects are under way.
These projects combine elements aimed at the
identification of contemporaneous developments
in a number of risk factors in different segments of
the financial system with forward looking elements.
Major findings of the Financial Stability Report
(FSR)
VI.3 The Financial Stability Report published in
June 2012 reiterated that the financial system of
the country remains robust. Risks to stability are,
however, elevated due to global factors and
domestic macroeconomic factors. The Reserve
Bank has been conducting periodic Systemic Risk
Surveys and, the findings of these Surveys reveal
that financial system stakeholders retain their
confidence in the stability of the system.
VI.4 Risks from the global developments –
growth slowdown, continuing instability in the euro
area, uncertain capital flows and the impact of
deleveraging by banks – will be accentuated by
domestic macroeconomic risks. Domestic growth
has slowed down. Savings and investment rates
are also lower. Inflation has moderated but risks
remain. Risks are also posed by the high levels of current account and fiscal deficits. However, the
intrinsic resilience of the domestic economy is high.
VI.5 Financial intermediaries remain robust.
Banks continued to be well capitalised and
profitable. Asset quality deteriorated but is not a
cause for systemic concern. Credit and deposit
growth in the banking sector has decelerated and
banks’ reliance on borrowed funds has increased.
Banks remained resilient to credit, market and
liquidity risks and would be able to withstand
macroeconomic shocks, given their comfortable
capital adequacy positions. However, distress
dependencies between banks rose, warranting
closer monitoring.
Financial Stability Development Council
VI.6 The Financial Stability and Development
Council (FSDC) was set up in December 2010 with
a view to providing focused attention on financial
stability. The Council’s remit also includes interregulatory
co-ordination, macroprudential
supervision of the economy, monitoring of financial
conglomerates, financial inclusion and financial
literacy. The sub-committee of the FSDC, headed
by the Reserve Bank Governor, has evolved as the
active operative arm of the Council since its
establishment. In line with the mandate of the
FSDC, the sub-committee, during the year,
reviewed potential threats to the stability of the
financial system, deliberated on issues requiring
co-ordination between the financial sector regulators
and various government departments and discussed
measures for taking forward initiatives towards
greater financial inclusion and literacy.
VI.7 The sub-committee of the FSDC was,
during the year, assisted by two technical groups
– a Technical Group on Financial Inclusion and
Financial Literacy and an Inter Regulatory Technical
Group. The sub-committee and its Technical Groups
deliberated upon a host of issues during the
year including a) the modalities for the introduction
of infrastructure development funds (IDFs);
b) development of the corporate bond market
including the market for repo in corporate bonds
and the market for credit default swaps; c) regulatory
issues relating to wealth management/private banking undertaken by banks; d) concerns arising
out of regulatory gaps in the non-banking finance
companies (NBFC) sector and regulation of
government sponsored NBFCs; e) impending risks
from foreign currency convertible bonds and
potential policy mitigants; f) implementing uniform
KYC norms in different segments of the financial
system and across the entire financial system; and
g) putting in place a national strategy for financial
education.
VI.8 With a view to institutionalising the
framework for supervision of financial conglomerates
(FCs) and monitoring and management of systemic
risks emanating from the activities of FCs, the subcommittee
of the FSDC has approved the creation
of an Inter Regulatory Forum under the chairmanship
of the Deputy Governor-in-charge of banking
supervision at the Reserve Bank with Executive
Director level membership from other peer
regulatory/supervisory agencies. The Inter
Regulatory Forum, would have responsibility for
framing policies for the FCs (like identification,
group-wide risk management, group-wide capital
adequacy, corporate governance, etc.) as well as
for conducting high level supervision of FCs. The
Forum would also seek to strengthen the supervisory
co-ordination/cooperation mechanism amongst the
domestic supervisors for effective supervision of
FCs.
ASSESSMENT OF THE BANKING SECTOR
Core Financial Soundness Indicators (FSIs) of
SCBs
VI.9 SCBs remained well capitalised, as both
CRAR (14.3 per cent) and core CRAR (10.4 per
cent) under Basel-II stood much above the
regulatory prescriptions (Table VI.1). Asset quality
of SCBs, which recorded improvement during 2010-
11, witnessed a deterioration during 2011-12. In
absolute terms, the gross NPAs of SCBs, especially
Public Sector Banks (PSBs), increased significantly
during 2011-12 (Table VI.2). With decline in income
from securities trading and due to higher risk
provisioning, SCBs recorded a lower growth of 15.5
per cent in their net profit during FY 2011-12.
Table VI.1: Select Financial Indicators |
(Per cent) |
Item |
End-March |
Scheduled
Commercial
Banks |
Scheduled
Urban
Co-operative
Banks |
All India
Financial
Institutions |
Primary Dealers |
Non-Banking
Financial
Companies-D |
NBFCs-ND-SI |
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
8 |
CRAR |
2011 |
14.2 |
12.5 |
22.0 |
46.2 |
22.5 |
32.8 |
|
2012 |
14.3 |
12.8 |
21.0 |
53.8 |
20.4 |
27.5 |
Core CRAR |
2011 |
10.0 |
N.A. |
N.A. |
N.A. |
17.2 |
30.5 |
|
2012 |
10.4 |
N.A. |
N.A. |
N.A. |
16.8 |
24.6 |
Gross NPAs to Gross Advances |
2011 |
2.4 |
5.7 |
0.3 |
N.A. |
0.9 |
1.9 |
|
2012 |
2.9 |
5.2 |
0.4 |
N.A. |
2.7 |
3.1 |
Net NPAs to Net Advances |
2011 |
0.9 |
1.0 |
0.1 |
N.A. |
# |
0.8 |
|
2012 |
1.2 |
1.4 |
0.1 |
N.A. |
0.8 |
1.8 |
Return on Total Assets |
2011 |
1.1 |
0.9 |
1.0 |
1.1 |
2.7 |
2.3 |
|
2012 |
1.1 |
1.0 |
1.0 |
0.8 |
N.A. |
1.8 |
Return on Equity |
2011 |
13.7 |
N.A. |
11.0 |
5.1 |
16.6 |
8.5 |
|
2012 |
13.6 |
N.A. |
12.0 |
4.4 |
N.A. |
7.0 |
Efficiency (Cost/Income Ratio) |
2011 |
46.2 |
49.9 |
24.0 |
36.1 |
72.0 |
68.7 |
|
2012 |
45.3 |
52.0 |
18.0 |
44.1 |
N.A. |
77.7 |
Interest Spread (per cent) |
2011 |
3.1 |
N.A. |
2.0 |
N.A. |
3.5 |
1.9 |
|
2012 |
3.1 |
N.A. |
2.0 |
N.A. |
N.A. |
2.3 |
Liquid Asset to total assets |
2011 |
29.8 |
N.A. |
N.A. |
N.A. |
N.A. |
N.A. |
|
2012 |
28.9 |
N.A. |
N.A. |
N.A. |
N.A. |
N.A. |
N.A.: Not Available. #: Provisions exceed NPAs.
Note: 1. Data for 2012 is unaudited and provisional.
2. Data for SCBs is excluding LABs.
3. Data for SCBs covers domestic operations, except for CRAR.
4. Data for CRAR of SCBs is pertaining to Basel II norms.
5. Data on Scheduled UCBs exclude Madhavpura Mercantile Co-operative Bank Ltd.
6. For NBFCs-D data for 2012 pertain to the period ended December 2011.
7. For NBFCs-ND-SI data in respect of CRAR, gross NPA and Net NPA for 2012 pertain to the period ended December 2011.
Source: 1. SCBs: Off-site supervisory returns.
2. UCBs: Off-site surveillance returns.
3. NBFCs: Off-site supervisory returns. |
Table VI.2: Bank Group wise NPA Ratios |
Bank Group |
End March |
Gross NPAs to Gross
Ad-
vances |
Net NPAs to Net
Ad-
vances |
Restructured Standard Advance
to Total
Standard Advances |
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
Public Sector Banks |
2010 |
2.28 |
1.09 |
5.07 |
|
2011 |
2.32 |
1.04 |
4.30 |
|
2012 |
3.17 |
1.47 |
5.92 |
Foreign Banks |
2010 |
4.26 |
1.82 |
0.54 |
|
2011 |
2.54 |
0.66 |
0.23 |
|
2012 |
2.68 |
0.61 |
0.14 |
New Private Sector Banks |
2010 |
3.22 |
1.18 |
1.68 |
|
2011 |
2.62 |
0.60 |
0.65 |
|
2012 |
2.18 |
0.44 |
1.08 |
Old Private Sector Banks |
2010 |
2.31 |
0.82 |
3.62 |
|
2011 |
1.97 |
0.53 |
2.95 |
|
2012 |
1.80 |
0.59 |
3.49 |
Accordingly, ROE of SCBs recorded a decline. Also,
NIM decreased from 3.14 per cent to 3.07 per cent
for the same period. The ratio of liquid assets to
total assets had also come down during 2011-12
and stood at 28.9 per cent at end March 2012 as
compared to 29.8 per cent as at end March 2011.
VI.10 In the case of scheduled UCBs an
improvement in CRAR is observed. The gross NPA
to gross advances ratio has declined indicating
improvement in asset quality. On the other side
however, the efficiency ratio deteriorated indicating
an increase in cost relative to income.
VI.11 Even though the NPA ratio of SCBs showed
an increase in 2012, an analysis using quarterly
data since June 2000 brings out the cyclicality in
asset quality of Indian banks (Box VI.1).
Box VI.1
NPAs and Credit Cycle
Asset quality is the key to understanding the financial health
and soundness of the banking system. The literature identifies
credit cycles as an important determinant of banks’ asset
quality. Cyclicality/pro-cyclicality has been defined as
“dynamic interactions (positive feedback mechanisms)
between the financial and real sectors of the economy” (FSF,
2009). Financial institutions tend to over-stretch their lending
portfolio during economic booms and tend to retrench the
same during economic downturns. It has been argued that
an expansion in credit growth is associated with the
deterioration in asset quality because when banks overexpand
their lending, they tend to lower their credit standards.
This behaviour translates itself into greater slippages in asset
quality at matured stages of the credit cycle. The literature
identifies various reasons for such pro-cyclical risk-taking
behaviour of banks, viz., “herd behaviour” (Rajan, 2005),
“principal-agent problem” between shareholders and
managers (Borio et al, 2001), “disaster myopia” or shortsightedness
in underestimating the likelihood of high-loss
low-probability events (Guttentag and Herring, 1986), among
others.
Asset quality has surfaced as an important concern for the
Indian banking sector in the recent years. In the period
immediately following the global financial crisis, when asset
quality of banks in most advanced and emerging economies
took a beating, the asset quality of Indian banks was largely
maintained, partly on account of the policy of loan
restructuring. However, between March 2009 and March 2012,
the gross NPAs ratio has shown an increasing trend albeit a
fall in 2010-11 (Table 1).
Table 1: Trends in gross and net NPAs ratio |
Item |
Mar
2008 |
Mar
2009 |
Mar
2010 |
Mar
2011 |
Mar
2012 |
Gross NPAs ratio (per cent) |
2.39 |
2.45 |
2.51 |
2.36 |
2.94 |
Net NPAs ratio (per cent) |
1.07 |
1.13 |
1.12 |
0.93 |
1.24 |
Source: RBI Supervisory returns. |
A cursory look at the growth in bank credit and gross NPAs
reveals a cyclical pattern (Chart 1). An empirical analysis to
model asset quality of Indian banks as illustrated in equation
(I), taking quarterly data from June 2000, suggests a lagged
statistically significant positive relation between deviations
from trend in credit to GDP (C-GDP) ratio (worked out using
Hodrick-Prescott filter) and growth in gross NPAs for the
second lag.1 The deviations from trend in C-GDP ratio has
been recommended as a principle guide by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) for determining
economic and financial cycles under its Basel III framework
(BIS, 2010).
*Significant at 1 per cent level.
This exercise brings out the cyclicality in the behaviour of
asset quality of Indian banks. Further, it justifies the countercyclical
prudential regulatory policy, as pursued by the
Reserve Bank, and corroborates the need to further
strengthen such a policy by basing it on a more systematic
and rule-based footing to effectively address the concern of
asset quality.
References:
Bank for International Settlements (2010), “Countercyclical
Capital Buffer – Consultative Document”, July.
Borio, C, Furfine, C. and Lowe, P. (2001), “Procyclicality of the
Financial System and Financial Stability: Issues and Policy
Options in Marrying the Macro- and Micro-Prudential
Dimensions of Financial Stability, BIS Papers, 1, March.
Financial Stability Forum (2009), Report of the Financial
Stability Forum on Addressing Pro-cyclicality in the Financial
System, Basel.
Guttentag, J. M. and Richard J. Herring (1986), “Disaster
Myopia in International Banking”, Essays in International
Finance, 164, International Finance section, Princeton
University.
Rajan, Raghuram (2005), “The Greenspan Era: Lessons for
the Future”, A Symposium of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City, Jackson Hole, August.
Sensitivity Analysis
VI.12 Banking system is subjected to sensitivity
tests to ascertain the resilience of banks to plausible
shocks likely to emanate from interest rate risk and
credit risk. This is then related to the overall capital
adequacy of commercial banks in withstanding the
applied shocks. The analysis is carried out both at
the aggregate level as well as at the individual bank
level based on supervisory data.
VI.13 Sensitivity analysis for interest rate risk of
81 SCBs was carried out for the year ended March
31, 2012. Under interest rate risk sensitivity
analysis, CRAR of SCBs under Basel-II, went down
to 11.9 per cent (from the existing 14.1 per cent)
when measured under an assumed rise in yields
by 150 bps, reflecting manageable financial
leverage. The impact of credit risk sensitivity
analysis on CRAR is also found to be manageable
at the system level. If existing NPAs are assumed
to increase by 150 per cent at the system level, the
CRAR would decline from 14.1 per cent to 11.5 per
cent and if only retail NPAs are assumed to increase
by 150 per cent at the system level, the CRAR of
the system would decline to 13.5 per cent.
MAJOR DECISIONS TAKEN BY BOARD FOR
FINANCIAL SUPERVISION
VI.14 The Board for Financial Supervision (BFS),
constituted in November 1994, has been the chief
guiding force behind the Reserve Bank’s supervisory
and regulatory initiatives. During 2011-12, the BFS
was reconstituted on account of reconstitution of
the Central Board of the Reserve Bank. The BFS
now has Shri Y.H. Malegam, Dr. Ela Bhatt, Dr.
Rajeev Gowda and Shri Kiran Karnik as Directormembers.
VI.15 The BFS had ten meetings during the year.
The BFS reviewed, inter alia, the performance and
the financial position of banks and financial
institutions during 2009-10 to 2010-11. It reviewed
memoranda on 88 inspection reports of banks/FIs
(26 reports of public sector banks, 23 of private
sector banks, 33 of foreign banks, 4 of local area
banks, and 2 of financial institutions). Of these,
while 6 reports were based on the financial position as on March 31, 2010, 82 reports were based on
the financial position as on March 31, 2011.
VI.16 During the period, the BFS also reviewed
16 summaries of inspection reports pertaining to
scheduled urban co-operative banks (UCBs), 4
summaries of financial highlights pertaining to
scheduled UCBs classified in Grade I/II and 22
summaries of financial highlights pertaining to
scheduled UCBs rated between A+ and B-.
VI.17 As directed by BFS, a committee was
formed to revise the annual financial inspection
(Afi) report format to make it more focused. Based
on the recommendations of the committee, a
revised format has been implemented from the
inspection cycle in 2012. The revised format and
the new guidelines would result in optimal utilisation
of supervisory resources besides reduction in the
time taken for inspection and issuance of crisp
inspection reports.
VI.18 While deliberating on the financial
inspections of All India Financial Institutions, the
BFS decided to alter the periodicity of their
inspection from annual to once in two years, as
these entities do not pose any systemic risks and
their performance is supervised by the Reserve
Bank on continuous basis through off-site
surveillance mechanism.
VI.19 The compensation practices, especially of
large financial institutions, were one of the important
factors which contributed to the recent global
financial crisis. Employees were too often rewarded
for increasing the short-term profit without adequate
recognition of the risks and long-term consequences
that their activities posed to the organisations.
These perverse incentives amplified the excessive
risk taking that severely threatened the global
financial system. As desired by the BFS, based on
the principles and standards issued by FSB, draft
guidelines on compensation of whole time directors
/Chief Executive Officers/other Risk takers and
Control function staff were issued. Taking into
account the comments received on the draft
guidelines from public as also stipulations suggested
by BCBS, the final guidelines on compensation to
private banks and foreign banks were issued in January 2012. These guidelines would require
banks to have effective governance of compensation,
to reduce incentives towards excessive risk taking,
alignment of compensation with prudent risk taking
and stakeholder engagement in compensation.
VI.20 While discussing the parameters considered
by a private housing development corporation for
sanction of housing loans, the BFS observed that
since the stamp duty registration and other
documentation charges are not realisable, these
should not be reckoned for arriving at the eligible
bank finance. Accordingly a revised circular was
issued advising banks not to include stamp duty,
registration and other documentation charges in
the cost of the housing project. BFS also observed
that it was not appropriate for banks to accept the
valuation of the properties without counter checking
it from the available market sources. Accordingly,
a circular has been issued to all banks.
VI.21 After obtaining approval from the BFS, the
license of the Madhavpura Mercantile cooperative
Bank Ltd., Ahmedabad was cancelled with effect
from the close of business on June 04, 2012 and
the Central Registrar of Co-operative Societies,
New Delhi (CRCS) was also requested to issue an
order for winding up the co-operative bank and
appoint a liquidator.
VI.22 While considering issues relating to
unlicensed StCBs/DCCBs, BFS directed, inter alia,
that 43 unlicensed banks (StCB-1, DCCBs-42), be
prohibited from accepting fresh deposits,
immediately. Apart from other directions, the BFS
has also directed that the unlicensed StCBs/DCCBs
will be given extension of time for six months to
comply with the licensing requirements. Accordingly,
directions were issued to 43 unlicensed banks.
COMMERCIAL BANKS
Regulatory Initiatives
Implementation of Basel III Capital Regulations
VI.23 In December 2010, the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision (BCBS) issued Basel III
capital regulations as a response to the lessons
learnt from the financial crisis. Accordingly, the Reserve Bank issued final guidelines on the capital
regulations on May 2, 2012 after due consideration
of the comments / suggestions received from
various stakeholders on the draft guidelines. These
guidelines would become operational from January
1, 2013. However, the minimum capital requirement
including capital conservation buffers will be
introduced in a phased manner and will be fully
implemented by March 31, 2018.
VI.24 Under Basel III, total capital of a bank in
India must be at least 9 per cent of risk weighted
assets (RWAs) (the BCBS requirement is minimum
8 per cent of RWAs). Tier 1 capital must be at least
7 per cent of RWAs (6 per cent as specified by the
BCBS); and Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital
must be at least 5.5 per cent of RWAs (4.5 per cent
as specified by BCBS). Due to the transitional
arrangements the capital requirements of banks
may be lower during the initial periods and higher
during later years. Therefore, banks have been
advised to do their capital planning accordingly.
VI.25 In addition to the minimum requirements as
indicated above, a capital conservation buffer
(CCB) in the form of common equity of 2.5 per cent
of RWAs is required to be maintained by banks.
Total capital with CCB will be 11.5 per cent (9 per
cent CRAR+2.5 per cent CCB) of RWAs. Under the
Basel III rules, total capital with CCB has been fixed
at 10.5 per cent (8 per cent CRAR +2.5 per cent
CCB).
VI.26 Under Basel III, a simple, transparent, nonrisk
based leverage ratio has been introduced. The
Basel Committee will test a minimum Tier 1
leverage ratio of 3 per cent during the parallel run
period from January 1, 2013 to January 1, 2017.
Reserve Bank has prescribed that during this
parallel run period, banks should strive to maintain
their existing level of leverage ratio but, in no case
the leverage ratio should fall below 4.5 per cent.
Banks having leverage below 4.5 per cent should
strive to achieve the target as early as possible.
The leverage ratio requirement will be finalised
taking into account the final proposal of the Basel
Committee.
Dynamic Provisioning Guidelines
VI.27 At present, banks generally make two types
of provisions viz., general provisions on standard
assets and specific provisions on non-performing
assets (NPAs). Since the level of NPAs varies
through the economic cycle, the resultant level of
specific provisions also behaves cyclically.
Consequently, lower provisioning during upturns,
and higher provisions during downturns have
procyclical effect on the real economy.
VI.28 To address pro-cyclicality of capital and
provisioning, efforts at international level are being
made to introduce countercyclical capital and
provisioning buffers. Reserve Bank accordingly
prepared a discussion paper on countercyclical
(dynamic) provisioning framework.
VI.29 The Dynamic Provisioning (DP) framework
is based on the concept of expected loss (EL). The
average level of losses a bank can reasonably
expect to experience is referred to as EL and is the
cost of doing business. It is generally covered by
provisioning and pricing. The objective of DP is to
smoothen the impact of incurred losses on the P&L
through the cycle, and not to provide general
provisioning cushion for expected losses. More
specifically, the DP created during a year will be
the difference between long run average expected loss of the portfolio for one year and the incremental
specific provisions made during the year.
VI.30 The parameters of the model suggested in
the discussion paper are calibrated based on data
of Indian Banks. Banks having capability to calibrate
their own parameters may, with the prior approval
of Reserve Bank, introduce DP framework using
the theoretical model indicated by Reserve Bank.
Other banks would have to use the standardised
calibration arrived at by the Reserve Bank.
Proprietary Trading by Banks
VI.31 In the aftermath of the financial crisis, Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act was enacted in July 2010, with a view to
bringing about significant reforms in the US
financial system. This law aims to improve
transparency to ensure better consumer protection,
eliminate loopholes that allow risky and abusive
practices to go on unnoticed and unregulated,
introduce stringent rules for credit rating agencies
and impose tough new capital and leverage
requirements on financial firms that make it
undesirable to get too big. One of the later additions
to the Dodd-Frank Wall street reform is the Volcker
Rule, which restricts banks’ ability to undertake
proprietary trading. These set of reforms may
increase borrowing costs in the short run but in the
long run would result in a more robust financial
system (Box VI.2).
Box VI.2
Impact of Volcker Rule on India
The Volcker rule is part of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which was signed
into a law in the aftermath of the global financial crisis in
2007-2008. The most discussed section of the rule is the
restrictions on proprietary trading by the nation’s largest
banks. In other words, a bank cannot trade in the investment
markets with the intent of making money, unless it is done
on behalf of a customer. A bank can serve as a middleman,
but not as a trader for its own benefit. The rule requires
federal banking agencies, the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) to issue regulation to prohibit insured
deposit taking institutions and their affiliates from engaging
in “proprietary trading” and investing in, sponsoring or
having certain business relationship with hedge fund or private equity fund (limiting a bank’s investments in
proprietary trading to no more than 3 per cent of the Tier
1 capital).
It has been argued that the rule, if implemented in
India, would reduce trading in bond markets, including
government bond markets, and increase borrowing costs
for governments, investors and companies; deter banks
from breaking into new markets by substantially curtailing
their risk-taking abilities. Concerns are also expressed that
short-term foreign exchange swaps would also be subject
to the restrictions and such restrictions could squeeze USD
funding significantly outside the US and could accelerate
the deleveraging of European banks by liquidating foreign
assets. The rule, however, is expected to be useful in
reinforcing financial stability.
Supervisory Initiatives
High Level Steering Committee to review the
Supervisory Policies, Procedures and Processes
for commercial banks
VI.32 Though the banking sector in India has
witnessed considerable changes in recent years
with sizeable growth in size, number and complexities
of banks’ businesses, the supervisory processes
at the Reserve Bank have, remained largely
unchanged. With a view to improving the quality of
it’s supervisory processes/techniques and
benchmarking them with the global best practices,
Reserve Bank had set up a High Level Steering
Committee (HLSC) under the Chairmanship of
Deputy Governor, Dr. K. C. Chakrabarty, comprising
experienced supervisors, practicing /retired bankers
and an academician as members. The HLSC has
sought to transform the extant supervisory
approach of examining the past performance
through a transaction-testing based (CAMELS)
framework to using trend analysis to find risk drivers
and predicting the path and passage of risks in the
banks’ books. The Committee is of the view that the
supervisory apparatus should not just focus on
regulatory compliance or solvency of a bank but
also on assessing the riskiness of a bank, its
preparedness to take on various risks vis-a-vis the
risk mitigation strategies. The Committee intends
to drive the banks towards adopting a risk based
business conduct within an indicative time-frame
through a system of incentives and disincentives.
The Committee has submitted its report on June
11, 2012. The recommendations of the committee
are being examined for implementation.
Bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)
with its Overseas Counterparts on Cross Border
Supervision and Cooperation
VI.33 The Reserve Bank has been entering into
bilateral MoUs with overseas supervisors for
effective cross border supervision and cooperation
in accordance with the extant domestic legal
provisions and the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS) Principles. Six such MoUs
have been signed with China Banking Regulatory
Commission (CBRC) South African Reserve Bank (SARB), Dubai Financial Services Authority
(DFSA), Qatar Financial Centre Regulatory
Authority (QFCRA) Qatar Central Bank (QCB), and
Central Bank of Oman as on June 30, 2012.
Subsequently MoUs have been signed with Jersey
Financial Services Commission (JFSC), FSA of
UK, FSA of Norway and Central Bank of the
Russian Federation (CBRF).
VI.34 The Reserve Bank has also been attending
the Supervisory College meetings of the major
foreign banks having presence in India. This has
proved to be a useful and effective channel for
sharing /exchanging supervisory information and
establishing contacts with overseas supervisors.
RBI is preparing to host Supervisory Colleges in
respect of some of the bigger Indian banks with
significant cross-border and cross-sector presence.
Thematic Reviews
VI.35 While general deficiencies are identified in
the Annual Financial Inspections (Afi) process,
certain observations having a bearing on the
efficiency of the banking system need to be studied
separately in a focused manner either through a
thematic review or through special audits. The
objective of these reviews is to evaluate the systems
followed by the select banks and to gain deeper
insight into the risk faced / practices followed by
different banks, with a view to assessing regulatory/
supervisory concerns and systemic risk if any. The
Reserve Bank has already initiated such a process
and so far carried out two thematic reviews - on
KYC and AML compliance in banks and real estate
exposures of banks.
Inspection of Overseas Branches of Indian Banks
VI.36 The inspection of select overseas branches
of Indian banks was undertaken in the month of
May 2012. The last inspection of the overseas
branches was conducted in May 2008. The present
inspection covered select branches of Indian banks
located in the regions of USA, UK, Hong Kong SAR,
Singapore and Bahrain and accounting for 59 per
cent of assets of overseas operations of Indian
banks as on end-March 2012. The purpose of the
inspection was to get first hand assessment of the
processes at the overseas branches, supervisory insight into the overseas operations of Indian banks,
concerns, if any, on the risky exposures to products
and process, especially in areas not permitted
within the Indian jurisdiction and assessing the
adequacy of risk management system and
oversight of the Head Office on such overseas
operations.
Sanctions Imposed on Banks/Financial Institutions
for KYC/AML/CFT Violations
VI.37 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an
inter-governmental body which sets international
standards on anti-money laundering/combating
financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). In 2009, the FATF
along with Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering
(APG) conducted an evaluation of India’s AML/CFT
framework and identified some gaps. An AML/CFT
Regulatory Framework Assessment Committee
was constituted by the central government in 2010
to examine the effectiveness and consistency of
AML/CFT regulatory framework in the country and
make recommendations in the areas where gaps
were found. Among other things, it was
recommended by the Committee that the statistics
on sanctions imposed on regulated entities for
violation of AML/CFT guidelines may be included
in Annual Reports of the regulators (Table VI.3).
CUSTOMER SERVICE
Complaints received and disposed
VI.38 Banking Ombudsman Scheme 2006
introduced and administered by the Reserve Bank
is a cost free apex level grievance redressal
mechanism for bank customers. During the year
2011-12 fifteen offices of the banking ombudsman
(OBOs), situated across the country received
72,889 complaints about deficiency in banking
services. Taking into account 4,618 complaints
pending at the beginning of the year, OBOs handled
77,507 complaints in the year. OBOs disposed of
72,885 complaints during the year clocking the
disposal rate of 94 per cent. As on June 30, 2012,
4,622 complaints were pending at OBOs.
VI.39 The Appellate Authority appointed under
the Banking Ombudsman Scheme 2006 receives
appeals against the award issued or decision given
by the Banking Ombudsman. During the year 2011-
12 the Appellate Authority received 351 appeals.
Out of these, 304 appeals were non-maintainable.
Of the remaining 47 maintainable appeals 19 were
disposed in favour of customers and 16 in favour
of banks. As on June 30, 2012, 12 appeals were
pending.
Table VI.3: Actions Against AML/KYC/CFT Violations |
Entities |
Advisory notices
issued* |
Show cause
notices |
Letters of
warning ** |
Entities
penalised*** |
Penalty
amount in
` millions |
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
Scheduled Commercial Banks |
1 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
2.5 |
Urban Co-operative Banks |
67 |
43 |
46 |
35 |
9.2 |
District Central Co-operative Banks |
- |
- |
- |
2 |
1.0 |
Regional Rural Banks |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
Authorised Persons |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
Money Transfer Service Scheme |
- |
6 |
1 |
- |
- |
Authorised Money Changers |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
Authorised Card Payment Networks |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
Non Banking Finance Companies |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
* : Advisory notice: After calling for explanation of the bank, when the committee of senior officers decides to issue an advisory letter to the bank and issue of show cause notice (SCN) is not considered necessary.
** : Warning letter: After receipt of reply to the SCN, the Committee of senior officers decides to issue a warning letter and not to impose
monetary penalty
*** : Penalised: When monetary penalty is imposed |
Position of Applications and Appeals Received
under RTI Act, 2005
VI.40 During the year 2011-12 fifteen offices of
the Banking Ombudsman (OBOs) received 740
applications and 171 appeals under RTI Act out of
which 703 applications and 157 appeals were
disposed during the year.
Damodaran Committee Report Implementation
VI.41 The Committee on Customer Service in
Banks (Damodaran Committee) which submitted
its report in July 2011, had made a total of 232
recommendations. Out of these, 107
recommendations have since been implemented
and Indian Banks Association (IBA) has issued
operating guidelines to the member banks in this
regard. The Reserve Bank has had two rounds of
discussions with the IBA and representatives of
BCSBI, Institute for Development and Research in
Banking Technology (IDRBT), National Payment
Corporation of India (NPCI) to work out the
modalities for taking forward the implementation
task of the remaining recommendations made by
the Damodaran Committee. The IBA has constituted
a sub-group to prepare its response in this regard
by referring to the relevant international standards
and best practices. Some of the main issues under
discussion include charges on non-home branch
transactions; penalty for cheques returned; onus
on banks to prove customers’ negligence in
fraudulent internet / ATM transactions; compensation
policy for protecting customers in case of
unauthorised / fraudulent transactions through
internet banking / card products and appointment
of chief customer service officer.
Reserve Bank and Common Man
VI.42 The Reserve Bank is a public institution
serving the public interest. The Reserve Bank has
taken several steps which directly or indirectly
benefit the common person in recent times.
Display of Information by Banks
VI.43 The Reserve Bank asked the banks to
ensure that accountholders have detailed
information on the availability and the cost of various banking services offered to start a banking
relationship. Banks have been advised to display
information in comprehensive Notice Board in bank
premises on various key aspects such as service
charges, interest rates, services offered, product
information, time norms for various banking
transactions etc. This display enables customers to
take informed decision regarding products and
services of the bank and be aware of their rights
as also the obligations of the banks to provide
certain essential services.
Banking Facilities for Disabled
VI.44 Banks have been advised to ensure that
all the banking facilities such as cheque book facility
including third party cheques, ATM facility, internet
banking facility, locker facility, retail loans, credit
cards etc., are invariably offered to the visually
challenged without any discrimination. Banks have
been advised to make at least one third of new
ATMs installed as talking ATMs with Braille keypads
and ensure that at least one talking ATM with Braille
keypad is generally available in each locality for
catering to needs of visually impaired persons.
Unclaimed Deposits/ Inoperative Accounts in Banks
VI.45 Keeping in view the public interest, detailed
instructions have been issued to banks on dealing
with unclaimed deposits / inoperative accounts and
to find the whereabouts of the customers and their
legal heirs. These instructions, inter alia, include
annual review of accounts in which there are no
operations, allowing operations in such accounts
after due diligence and no charge to be levied for
activation of inoperative accounts. Further, banks
have been advised to display the list of unclaimed
deposits/inoperative accounts which are inactive /
inoperative for ten years or more on their respective
websites.
Officially Valid Documents
VI.46 Letters issued by the Unique Identification
Authority of India containing details of name,
address and Aadhar number are now accepted as
‘officially valid document’ for opening all types of accounts in banks. Documents like income tax
return in the name of the sole proprietor and utility
bills in the name of proprietary concern are also to
be accepted for opening accounts of sole proprietary
concerns.
Grievances Redressal by Banks
VI.47 To strengthen the grievances redressal
mechanism (GRM) banks have been advised that
they should: i) ensure that the principal nodal officer
appointed under the Banking Ombudsman Scheme
is of a sufficiently senior level, not below the rank
of a General Manager, ii) Contact details of the
principal nodal officer to be prominently displayed
on the first page of the web-site so that the
aggrieved customer can approach the bank with a
sense of satisfaction arising from being attended
at a senior level, iii) GRM should be made simpler
even if it is linked to call centre of customer care
unit without customers facing hassle of proving
identity, account details, etc., and iv) adequate and
wider publicity are also required to be given by the
respective financial service provider.
Clarification on Nomination Rules
VI.48 It was observed that some banks were
insisting attestation of signatures of customers on
various forms filled by them. Clarification was
issued to banks reiterating that only thumb
impressions and not signatures made on various
forms are required to be attested.
Intra-bank Deposit Account Portability
VI.49 It was observed that some banks were
insisting on opening fresh accounts when customers
approach them for transferring their account from
one branch to another branch of the same bank,
causing inconvenience to the customers. Banks
were, therefore, advised that KYC once done by a
branch of the bank should be valid for transfer of
the account within the bank.
Abolition of Foreclosure Charges / Prepayment
Penalty on Home Loans
VI.50 The Damodaran Committee had viewed
foreclosure charges on flexible interest rate home loans as a restrictive practice deterring the
borrowers from switching over to cheaper available
source. It was therefore decided that banks will not
be permitted to charge foreclosure charges / prepayment
penalties on home loans on floating
interest rate basis, with immediate effect. It is felt
that the removal of foreclosure charges/prepayment
penalty on home loans will lead to a reduction in
the discrimination between existing and new
borrowers and the competition among banks will
result in finer pricing of home loans with floating
rate.
Unique Customer Identification Code for Banks’
Customers in India
VI.51 It was observed that while some of the
Indian banks had developed Unique Customer
Identification Code (UCIC), there was no unique
number to identify a single customer across the
organisation in many banks. The UCIC will help
banks to identify a customer, track the facilities
availed, monitor financial transactions in various
accounts, improve risk profiling, take a holistic view
of customer profile and smoothen banking
operations for the customer. While such a system
for the entire financial system is desirable, it is likely
to take quite some time for a complete roll out. As
a first step in this direction banks were advised to
initiate steps to allot UCIC number to all their
customers while entering into any new relationships
in the case of all individual customers to begin with.
Banks were also advised that the existing individual
customers may also be allotted UCIC by end-April
2013.
BANKING CODES AND STANDARDS BOARD
OF INDIA
VI.52 The membership of Banking Codes and
Standards Board of India (BCSBI) has grown from
67 banks in 2006 to 121 banks as of May 2012 and
membership of 10 more banks is under process.
The objective of setting up the BCSBI as an
independent and autonomous body to ensure fair
treatment to customers will be achieved only when
the provisions of the codes are adhered to in letter
and spirit by member banks. BCSBI continued to monitor compliance with the provisions of the codes
through an annual statement of compliance from
members as also survey of select bank branches.
During the year, BCSBI undertook survey of 2,083
branches and processing centres spread over 47
cities in India. The survey revealed perceptible
improvement in compliance. BCSBI also continued
its efforts to spread awareness of the organisation
and the codes among the public by carrying out
publicity campaigns through TV, radio and posters
on bus panels. BCSBI officials also addressed
gatherings of customers and bankers in customer
meets and participated in town hall events
conducted by the Reserve Bank as also in select
outreach programmes of Banking Ombudsmen.
BCSBI also arranged seminars of micro and small
enterprises (MSE) borrowers and MSE trade and
industry associations.
URBAN CO-OPERATIVE BANKS
Internet Banking
VI.53 Scheduled UCBs having minimum net worth
of ` 1 billion, CRAR of at least 10 per cent, net NPA
less than 5 per cent and have earned net profit
continuously in the last three financial years were
permitted to offer internet banking facility to their
customers with prior approval of the Reserve Bank.
Revision in Limits of Housing Loans and
Repayment Period
VI.54 The individual housing loan limits for UCBs
were revised and UCBs in Tier-I category were
permitted to extend individual housing loans up to
a maximum of `3 million per beneficiary of dwelling
unit and that in Tier- II up to a maximum of `7 million
per beneficiary of a dwelling unit subject to extant
prudential exposure limits. The maximum repayment
period of housing loans granted by UCBs was
revised from 15 years to 20 years.
Interest Rates on Rupee Export Credit
VI.55 AD category 1 UCBs were advised to extend
interest subvention of 2 per cent on pre-shipment
and post-shipment rupee export credit to specified
sectors up to March 31, 2013.
Payment of Cheques/Drafts/ Pay Orders/ Banker’s
Cheques
VI.56 UCBs were advised not to make payment
of cheques/drafts/pay orders/ banker’s cheques, if
they are presented beyond the period of three
months from the date of such instrument with effect
from April 1, 2012.
Access to NDS-OM
VI.57 UCBs fulfilling certain eligibility criteria such
as minimum CRAR of 9 per cent, net NPA less than
5 per cent, minimum net worth of ` 250 million etc.
were allowed direct access to Negotiated Dealing
System- Order Matching (NDS-OM) with the prior
approval of the Reserve Bank.
Dissemination of Credit Information of Suit-Filed
Accounts
VI.58 UCBs were advised to submit quarterly a
list of suit filed accounts of ` 10 million and above
classified as doubtful or loss and a list of suit filed
accounts of willful defaulters of ` 2.5 million and
above to CIBIL and/or any other credit information
company which has obtained CoR from the
Reserve Bank and of which the bank is a member.
Supervisory Action Framework
VI.59 A revised supervisory action framework was
introduced for UCBs with effect from March 1, 2012.
The framework envisages, in the initial stage of
deterioration in the financial position, self corrective
action by the management of the UCBs themselves
and supervisory action by the Reserve Bank in case
the financial position of the bank does not improve.
Convergence of IAS with IFRS
VI.60 As announced in the Annual Policy
Statement 2010-11, UCBs having net worth in
excess of ` 3 billion were advised to take necessary
steps to ensure that they are in readiness to adopt
the International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS) converged with the Indian Accounting
Standards (IAS) from April 1, 2013 and those with
net worth in excess of `2 billion but not exceeding
`3 billion from April 1, 2014.
Restricted Letters of Credit (LC)
VI.61 UCBs were advised that in case of bills
drawn under LCs restricted to a particular UCB,
and if the beneficiary of the LC is not a borrower
who has been granted regular credit facility by that
UCB, the UCB concerned may, as per their
discretion and based on their perception about the
credit worthiness of the LC issuing bank, negotiate
such LCs, subject to the condition that the proceeds
will be remitted to the regular banker of the
beneficiary of the LC. UCBs would have to adhere
to the instructions of the Reserve Bank / RCS or
CRCS regarding share linking to borrowing and
provisions of Co-operative Societies Act on
membership while negotiating restricted LCs.
Exposure to Housing, Real Estate and Commercial
Real Estate
VI.62 UCBs’ exposure to housing, real estate and
commercial real estate loans were limited to 10 per
cent of their total assets which could be exceeded
by an additional 5 per cent of total assets for
housing loans to individuals up to `1.5 million. With
effect from April 26, 2012, UCBs have been allowed
to utilise the additional limit of 5 per cent of total
assets, for grant of housing loans to individuals up
to `2.5 million, which is covered under the priority
sector.
Merger and Amalgamation
VI.63 The consolidation of the UCBs through the
process of merger of weak entities with stronger ones was set in motion through transparent and
objective guidelines issued in February 2005. In
January 2009 the Reserve Bank issued another
set of guidelines for merger/acquisition of UCBs
having negative net worth as on March 31, 2007.
The process of merger/amalgamation requires the
acquirer bank to submit the proposal along with
some specified information to RCS / CRCS and the
Reserve Bank. Pursuant to the issue of guidelines
on merger of UCBs, the Reserve Bank received
168 proposals for merger upto March 2012 and
issued NOCs to 125 proposals of which notifications
have been issued for 107 mergers by respective
RCs/CRCs (Table VI.4).
Table VI.4: Year-wise Progress in Mergers/
acquisitions as on March 31, 2012 |
Financial year |
Proposals received by the Reserve Bank |
NOCs issued by the Reserve Bank |
Merger effected (Notified by RCS) |
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
2005-06 |
24 |
13 |
5 |
2006-07 |
32 |
17 |
18 |
2007-08 |
42 |
28 |
24 |
2008-09 |
16 |
26 |
22 |
2009-10 |
26 |
17 |
12 |
2010-11 |
17 |
13 |
13 |
2011-12 |
11 |
11 |
13 |
Total |
168 |
125 |
107 |
VI.64 Maximum number of mergers took place in
the State of Maharashtra, followed by Gujarat and
Andhra Pradesh (Table VI.5).
Table VI.5: State-wise Progress in Mergers/Acquisition of UCBs |
States |
2005-06 |
2006-07 |
2007-08 |
2008-09 |
2009-10 |
2010-11 |
2011-12 |
Total |
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
8 |
9 |
Maharashtra |
2 |
12 |
14 |
16 |
6 |
7 |
8 |
65 |
Gujarat |
3 |
4 |
5 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
20 |
Andhra Pradesh |
- |
1 |
3 |
1 |
3 |
1 |
- |
09 |
Karnataka |
- |
- |
1 |
2 |
- |
- |
- |
03 |
Punjab |
- |
1 |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
1 |
Uttarakhand |
- |
- |
1 |
1 |
- |
- |
- |
2 |
Chhattisgarh |
- |
- |
- |
1 |
- |
1 |
- |
2 |
Rajasthan |
- |
- |
- |
- |
2 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
Madhya Pradesh |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
1 |
- |
1 |
Total |
5 |
18 |
24 |
22 |
12 |
13 |
13 |
107 |
RURAL CO-OPERATIVES
Developments in Rural Cooperative Credit
Structure
Position of unlicensed StCBs/DCCBs
VI.65 The Reserve Bank on October 14, 2009
had issued guidelines for granting licence to those
State Co-operative Banks (StCBs) and District
Central Co-operative Banks (DCCBs) that had
CRAR of 4 per cent and above, subject to condition
that there is no default in maintenance of CRR/SLR
during the last one year (default up to two occasions
permitted). Accordingly, the Reserve Bank has
been issuing licences to StCBs/DCCBs which
satisfy the above relaxed conditions recommended
by NABARD and periodical review of the unlicensed
StCBs/DCCBs is being done in consultation with
NABARD from time to time. After considering
NABARD’s recommendations with respect to
inspections/quick scrutiny, 43 banks (StCB-1,
DCCBs-42) have remained unlicensed as on March
31, 2012. Subsequently, two banks (Assam StCB
and Giridih DCCB) have been licensed after they
fulfilled the licensing norms. Currently, out of 43
banks, 41 DCCBs are unlicensed and continue to
be under directions.
VI.66 A task force to monitor the progress of
implementation of monitorable action plan (MAP)
by the unlicenced DCCBs has been formed at
respective Regional Offices (ROs) of the Reserve
Bank with a view to ensuring that these banks attain
the eligibility for issue of a licence in the shortest
possible time. The task force would also examine
alternative formal channels of credit in the regions
where these banks are currently functioning so as
to ensure that the banking services in these regions
are not adversely affected. An ‘Expert Committee’
to review the STCCS has been constituted to make
an in-depth analysis of STCCS. The committee is
headed by Dr. Prakash Bakshi, Chairman NABARD
and includes professionals in co-operatives.
Developments in Regional Rural Banks
Scheduling of RRBs
VI.67 Out of 82 RRBs, 2 amalgamated RRBs are
yet to be included in the second schedule of the
RBI Act, 1934.
Recapitalisation of RRBs
VI.68 The central government had, in September
2009, constituted a committee (Chairman: Dr. K.C.
Chakrabarty) to study the current level of CRAR of
RRBs and to suggest a roadmap for enhancing the
same to 9 per cent level by March 31, 2012. The
committee submitted its report to the government
on April 30, 2010. The committee has assessed
that 40 RRBs (out of 82) will require capital infusion
to the extent of `22 billion. The reports received
from NABARD show that as on June 6, 2012, 16
RRBs have been recapitalised fully whereas in 11
RRBs, the recapitalisation process is underway. To
complete the process, the recapitalisation scheme
has been extended up to 2013-14.
DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND CREDIT
GUARANTEE CORPORATION
VI.69 Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee
Corporation (DICGC) is a wholly owned subsidiary
of the Reserve Bank. Deposit insurance extended
by DICGC covers all commercial banks, including
Local Area Banks (LABs) and Regional Rural Banks
(RRBs) in all the States and Union Territories (UTs).
All co-operative banks across the country are also
covered by deposit insurance. The number of
registered insured banks as on March 31, 2012
stood at 2,199 comprising 87 commercial banks,
82 RRBs, 4 LABs and 2,026 co-operative banks.
With the present limit of deposit insurance in India
at `0.1 million, the number of fully protected
accounts (996 million) as on March 31, 2012
constituted 92.8 per cent of the total number of
accounts (1,073 million) as against the international
benchmark2 of 80 per cent. Amount-wise, insured
deposits at `19,043 billion constituted 33.0 per cent of assessable deposits at `57,674 billion against
the international benchmark of 20 to 40 per cent.
At the current level, the insurance cover works out
to 1.64 times per capita GDP as on March 31, 2012.
The Corporation builds up its deposit insurance
fund (DIF) through transfer of its surplus, i.e.,
excess of income (mainly comprising premia
received from insured banks, interest income from
investments and cash recovery out of assets of
failed banks) over expenditure each year, net of
taxes. This fund is used for settlement of claims of
depositors of banks taken into liquidation /
reconstruction / amalgamation etc. During the year
2011-12, the Corporation settled aggregate claims
for `2,873 million in respect of 58 co-operative
banks (18 main claims and 40 supplementary
claims) as compared with claims for ` 3,790 million
during the previous year. The size of the DIF stood
at `300 billion as on March 31, 2012, yielding a
reserve ratio (DIF/Insured Deposits) of 1.6 per cent.
VI.70 The Financial Stability Board (FSB)
undertook a peer review of deposit insurance
systems among its member institutions based on
the BCBS-IADI ‘Core Principles for Effective
Deposit Insurance Systems’ and the assessment
methodology. The peer review report observes that
the global financial crisis has illustrated the
importance of effective depositor compensation
arrangements. The crisis resulted in greater
convergence in practices across jurisdictions and
emerging consensus about appropriate design
features that include higher coverage levels,
elimination of co-insurance, improvements in the
payout process, greater depositor awareness,
adoption of ex-ante funding by more jurisdictions,
and strengthening of information sharing and
coordination with other safety net participants.
VI.71 Some of the recommendations given in the
peer review report are especially relevant for India
in the context of (i) review of coverage levels to
ensure that it strikes an appropriate balance
between depositor protection and market discipline;
(ii) prompt depositor reimbursement in situations when payout is the only choice to deal with a bank
failure; this needs to be supported by comprehensive
and prompt access to bank data, early information
access via a single customer view, and robust
information technology infrastructure; (iii)
strengthening of degree of co-ordination between
the deposit insurance agency and other safety net
players to ensure effective resolution planning and
prompt depositor payment; (iv) unambiguous and
immediate access to reliable funding sources
(including any back-up funding options) to meet the
financing requirements.
VI.72 As part of its Golden Jubilee celebrations,
DICGC hosted an international conference in
collaboration with International Association of
Deposit Insurers (IADI) on ‘Role of Deposit
Insurance in Bank Resolution Framework-Lessons
from the Financial Crisis’ in November 2011. The
theme of the conference reflected the evolving
thinking on the various elements of financial safety
net framework in post-financial crisis period
wherein need was felt for a well-defined resolution
framework for banks and closer integration of the
deposit insurance agency with other players in the
safety net.
NON-BANKING FINANCIAL COMPANIES
Creation of New Categories of NBFCs
VI.73 During 2011-12 two new categories of
NBFCs, viz., Infrastructure Debt Funds-NBFC
(NBFC-IDF) and the Micro Finance Institution
(NBFC-Mfi) were created and brought under
separate regulatory frameworks. Detailed guidelines
have been prescribed on the entry point norms,
prudential norms for capital adequacy, asset
classification and provisioning for both the
categories of the NBFCs (Box VI.3 and VI.4).
Miscellaneous Instructions
VI.74 NBFCs have been allowed to participate in
Credit Default Swap (CDS) market only as users
and hence not permitted to sell protection and or
enter into short positions in the CDS contracts.
Box VI.3
NBFCs - Infrastructure Debt Fund
In an emerging economy like India, garnering adequate
resources for infrastructure projects, which typically have
long gestation lags, is a major challenge. While infrastructure
development is crucial for giving fillip to the growth impulses
of the economy, traditional modes of bank finance are usually
constrained by asset-liability mismatch considerations, given
the long-term requirements of infrastructure finance. Against
this backdrop, the Union Budget 2010-11 announced the
setting up Infrastructure Debt Funds (IDFs) as a company
structure (IDF-NBFC) and as a Trust structure (IDF-MF) to
be regulated by the Reserve Bank and SEBI respectively,
and which can provide long-term funding and refinance
to infrastructure projects. IDFs will be investing only in
public private partnerships (PPP) infrastructure projects
which have completed one year of satisfactory commercial operations (COD) with a credit enhancement provided by
the project authority (such as NHAI).
While all NBFCs would be eligible to sponsor IDF-MFs under
certain conditions, only banks and infrastructure finance
companies can sponsor IDF-NBFC with prior approval of the
Reserve Bank. Regulation of the IDF-NBFC will be similar to
that of IFCs except that certain regulatory concessions in the
form of lower risk weights and higher exposure norms have
been allowed in keeping with the low risk assets held by
them. The IDF-NBFCs would raise resources through issue
of either rupee or dollar denominated bonds of minimum 5
year maturity. The investors would be primarily domestic and
off-shore institutional investors, especially insurance and
pension funds which would have long term resources.
VI.75 Fixed deposits by NBFCs cannot be treated
as financial assets. Consequently, interest income
on fixed deposits with banks will also not be treated
as income from financial assets.
VI.76 NBFCs were advised that if they fail to
commence NBfibusiness within a period of six months from the date of issue of Certificate of
Registration (CoR), their registration will stand
withdrawn automatically.
VI.77 NBFCs were advised not to change the
ownership prior to the commencement of business
and regularisation of their CoR.
Box VI.4
NBFC-Micro Finance Institutions
In the initial years of development the microfinance sector
was essentially an extension of the formal banking channel
led by the bank-SHG model and was aimed at developing
the habit of thrift as also bringing the borrowers under the
formal credit delivery channel. Gradually, the Micro Finance
Institutions (MFIs) moved towards a more formal, profit
oriented approach and into company structures. Banks too
found that MFIs enabled them to fulfil priority sector targets.
In the recent years, the sector has become dominated by
for-profit companies registered as NBFCs and regulated
by the Reserve Bank. Further, not-for-profit companies
established under section 25 of the Companies Act fulfilling
certain criteria have been exempted from the Reserve Bank
regulation.
There was an uneasy relationship existing between the forprofit MFIs registered as NBFCs and the state governments
in the southern part of the country where the MFIs were
concentrated on issues relating to multiple lending, over
indebtedness of the borrower, higher rate of interest charged
and coercive recovery practices. The above concerns
were amplified by the perception that the Mfisector was disproportionately benefitting the private shareholders,
including PE funds and other foreign investors at the
expense of poor borrowers. The huge valuations attracted
by SKS Microfinance in their initial public offering (IPO) and
corporate governance issues in the company reaffirmed
these perceptions.
Consequently, the Andhra Pradesh (AP) government
promulgated the Andhra Pradesh Microfinance Institutions
(Regulation of Money Lending) Act in October 2010 to
regulate the functioning of microfinance entities in the state.
Provisions of the act were onerous to comply with and
resulted in bringing all Mfiactivities, including lending and
collection activities by NBFCs to a complete halt.
In response, the Reserve Bank appointed the Malegam
Committee to study the issues and concerns in the sector.
Based on the recommendations of the Malegam Committee
Report, the Reserve Bank issued regulatory guidelines for
MFIs in December 2011. The guidelines address issues
like eligibility parameters for classification as NBFC-Mfiin
the form of qualifying assets, entry point norms for NBFC-Mfi, prudential norms, including capital adequacy and
provisioning norms, pricing of credit, transparency in interest
rates, multiple lending, over borrowing, ghost-borrowing, fair
practices in lending, coercive methods of recovery, corporate
governance.
The sector, however, in particular AP based NBFCs, plunged
into severe crisis, as the entire AP based portfolios of the
NBFCs had either to be provided for or written off, adversely
affecting their NOF and capital adequacy.
In recognition of difficulties being faced by the MfiSector,
the Bank has modified the directions to Mfito enable them
to register immediately with the Reserve Bank as NBFCMfiso that funding by banks and lending to the sector is
resumed. The modifications entail, inter alia, phasing out
compliance to entry point capital by March 2014; redefining
qualifying assets as those created on or after January 01,
2012; removal of 26 per cent cap on interest rate to allow for operational flexibilities and putting in place margin caps
of 10 per cent for large NBFC-Mfi(with asset size of `1
billion and above) and 12 per cent for others. In addition, the
provisioning made towards AP portfolio as on March 2013
would be added back notionally over a period of five years till
March 2017 for the purpose of ensuring compliance to NOF
and CRAR. A revised Fair Practices Code has also been
put in place taking into account the specific business model
of the MFIs. The Reserve Bank is also in favour of putting
in place SRO mechanism to ensure effective monitoring of
sector.
Recently, the central government has introduced a Micro
Finance Institutions (Development and Regulation) Bill
2012, which proposes to bring all Mfistructures under the
regulatory purview of the Reserve Bank. The bill, however,
is yet to be enacted.
VI.78 As Core Investment Companies (CICs) may
be required to issue guarantees or take on other
contingent liabilities on behalf of their group entities,
it was advised in May 2012 that CICs which are
exempt from registration requirement must be able
to meet these obligation without recourse to public
funds, in case the liability devolves.
VI.79 In keeping with the central government’s
‘green’ initiative, NBFCs were requested to take
proactive steps in increasing the use of electronic
payment systems, elimination of post-dated
cheques and gradual phase-out of cheques in their
day to day business transactions which would result
in more cost-effective transactions and faster and
accurate settlements.
VI.80 In the normal course of their business,
NBFCs are exposed to credit and market risks in
view of asset-liability transformation. Off-balance
sheet exposures of NBFCs have increased with
participation in the designated currency options
and futures and interest rate futures as clients for
the purpose of hedging their underlying exposures.
Hence, the off-balance sheet regulatory framework
has been expanded to introduce greater granularity
in the risk weights and credit conversion factors for
different types of off balance sheet items, including
market related and non-market related.
VI.81 The extant guidelines on classification of
frauds, approach towards monitoring of and
reporting system for frauds for deposit taking
NBFCs have been extended to NBFCs-ND-SIs as
well, besides having to report the same in their
balance sheets.
VI.82 NBFCs that are predominantly engaged in
lending against the collateral of gold jewellery and
face inherent concentration risk, besides facing
operational risks in their functioning have been
directed by the Reserve Bank to limit Loan to Value
(LTV) to 60 per cent and raise Tier l capital to 12
per cent by April 01, 2014. They have also been
prohibited from granting loans against bullion or
primary gold and gold coins. Further, banks have
been advised to reduce their exposure ceiling on
a single NBFC, having gold loans to the extent of
50 per cent or more of its total financial assets, from
the existing 10 per cent to 7.5 per cent of banks’
capital funds, with certain concessions to the
infrastructure sector. In addition, in order to
strengthen the internal controls, such NBFCs have
been directed to put in place a board approved
policy for lending, encapsulating proper adherence
to KYC norms, storage and insurance of gold
received as collateral and fair and transparent
auction procedures.
VI.83 The central government has notified the
Factoring Regulation Act, 2011 on January 22,
2012 to regulate factors and assignment of
receivables in favour of factors, as also delineate
the rights and obligations of parties to assignment
of receivables. The Resave Bank has since issued
detailed guidelines on registration and regulation
of factors including placing prudential regulation
and reporting discipline on them. The banks and
government companies are however exempt from
registration under the Act. Factors seeking
registration, need to fulfill minimum NOF of `5 crore;
principal business criteria of factoring assets and income from such assets to be not less than 75
per cent of total assets and income respectively.
Factors dealing in export / import factoring will need
to also comply with FEMA regulation.
Issues and Concerns in the NBFC Sector
VI.84 In the light of the international concerns on
shadow banking and potential threats to the
financial system as well as to reduce the regulatory
gaps that might exist between the NBFC sector
and the rest of the financial system, the Reserve
Bank set up a Working group on the Issues and
Concerns in the NBFC Sector (Box VI.5). The
working group examined the issue of non-financial activities of NBFCs and in the light of its
recommendation on principal business of NBFCs, a study was conducted to gauge the non-financial
activities of NBFCs-ND-SI (Box VI.6).
Box VI.5
Recommendations of the Working Group on the Issues and Concerns in the NBFC Sector
The NBFC sector in India has undergone a significant
transformation in the past few years, with significant growth
of non-deposit taking systemically important NBFCs
(NBFC-ND-SI). The recent global financial crisis has
also highlighted the risks arising from regulatory gaps,
arbitrage and systemic inter-connectedness of the financial
system. The Reserve Bank constituted a Working Group
(Chairperson: Smt. Usha Thorat) to reflect on the broad
principles that underpin the regulatory architecture for
NBFCs keeping in view the economic role and heterogeneity
of this sector and the recent international experience. The
key recommendations of the Working Group are:
1. There is a need to raise the entry point norms for NBFCs
to a minimum asset size of `50 crore for registration
and that the twin-criterion for determining the principal
business of an NBFC should be increased to 75 per
cent of the total asset and total income, respectively,
from the present 50:50 criteria;
2. NBFCs not accessing public funds may be exempted
from registration provided their assets are below `10
billion;
3. Any transfer of shareholding, direct or indirect, of 25
per cent and above, change in control, merger or
acquisition should have prior approval of the Reserve
Bank;
4. To address concentration, the group recommended
Tier I capital to be raised to 12 per cent, introduction of
a liquidity ratio and alignment of prudential norms with
those of banks.
5. NBFCs may be subject to regulations while undertaking
margin financing, similar to banks while lending to
stock brokers and merchant banks and as specified
by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) to stock brokers. Board approved limits for bank’s
exposure to real estate may be made applicable for the
bank group as a whole, where there is an NBFC in the
group. The risk weights for stand-alone NBFCs may
be raised to 150 per cent for capital market exposures
and 125 per cent for Commercial Real Estate (CRE)
exposures. In case of bank sponsored NBFCs, the risk
weights for Capital Market Exposures (CME) and CRE
may be the same as specified for banks;
6. Financial conglomerate approach may be adopted for
supervision of larger NBFCs that have stock brokers
and merchant bankers in the group and government
owned NBFCs may comply with the regulatory
framework applicable to NBFCs at the earliest.
7. NBFCs may be given the benefits under SARFAESI
Act, 2002;
8. Captive NBFCs, financing parent company’s products,
may maintain Tier I capital at 12 per cent and
supervisory risk assessment of such companies should
take into account the risk of the parent company;
9. For the purpose of applicability of registration and
supervision, the total assets of all NBFCs in a group
should be taken together to determine the cut off limit
of `1 billion;
10. Disclosure norms needs to be strengthened for NBFCs
with asset size of `10 billion. Such companies whether
listed or not, should be required to comply with Clause
49 of SEBI Listing Agreements; and
11. Supervision of NBFCs with assets of `10 billion and
above should be strengthened including stress tests to
ascertain their vulnerability.
Box VI.6
Non-Financial Activities of NBFCs
One of the issues examined by Working Group on issues
and concerns in the NBFC sector the principal business
criteria under which a company is identified as an NBFC
both, if its financial assets are more than 50 per cent of its
total assets and income from financial assets comprise 50
per cent of the total income. Hence, unlike in the case of
banks, NBFCs are allowed to conduct multiplicity of activities
including non-financial activities not regulated by the
Reserve Bank. A study was conducted to gauge the nonfinancial activities of NBFCs-ND-SI and the risks, if any, to
them from such activities. The analysis revealed the following
trends:
a) The non-financial activities undertaken by NBFCs include
(i) Fee-based: distribution of financial and insurance
products, remittance services, consultancy and advisory
services, portfolio management, trademark fees (ii)
Service oriented activities such as leasing of premises,
computer training, BPO services, business support,
charter services, travel and ticketing, maintenance
services, tea packing (iii) trading, manufacturing,
windmill-power generation, development of software, selling of computers, cloths or garments, agriculture and
real estate, etc.
b) Only around 17 per cent of NBFCs-ND-SI are engaged
in non-financial activities, hence not significant, both in
terms of percentage of non-financial assets to total
assets and/ or non-financial income to total income.
c) The extent of non-financial assets to the total assets of
the NBFCs engaged in non-financial activities varied
from 0.02 to 29.5 per cent. The non-financial income to
gross income ranged from 0.01 to 86 per cent.
d) Most of the non-financial activity was in fee-based
business or services. Activities such as trading,
distribution of products or manufacturing activities were
confined to only a few NBFCs-ND-SI.
The Working Group has recommended raising the threshold
percentage of financial asset and financial income from 50:50
to 75:75 so that the primary content of the business reflects
financial activity and the company focuses primarily on
financial business.
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