To justify my presence here, let me take
this opportunity to mention some of the recent developments which should be
kept in view in the deliberations of the conference.
First, under the provisions of the Fiscal
Responsibility and Budget Management Act, 2003, the Reserve Bank will not be
participating, in the normal circumstances, in the primary market for the government
securities from the start of 2006-07. The Technical Group that I referred to
is currently working on the operational, technological and institutional aspects
of this. Hence, the market perspectives on the implications of this development
can best be articulated in the conference today.
Second, the Twelfth Finance Commission has
made certain recommendations which would mean that the State Governments would
approach the market instead of obtaining loans from the Government of India.
Several operational and other issues will have to be addressed in the management
of the borrowing programme of the State Governments, in future. We are convening
a Conference of the State Finance Secretaries on 8th April 2005,
which will be addressed by Dr. C. Rangarajan, Chairman, Economic Advisory Council
to the Prime Minister and the former Chairman, Twelfth Finance Commission, to
discuss these issues. The road map that this Conference would indicate in this
regard will be helpful for our discussions and further policy formulation in
regard to debt-papers of the State Governments.
Third, the Central Government budget has
proposed a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) for raising resources for investment
in infrastructure. The issuance of debt-paper with relatively longer maturity,
outside the Government of India’s normal borrowing programme, is yet another
recent dimension added to the debt-market developments in the country.
Finally, several legislative changes on
the anvil provide new opportunities for further development of fixed income
markets. For example, the long awaited Government Securities Bill is at an advanced
stage of processing. The Finance Minister, in his budget speech, announced the
intention of the Government to bring about amendments to the RBI Act and the
Banking Regulation Act and the amendments relating to statutory pre-emptions
could have implications for fixed income markets.
In this context, it is useful to recognise
that the stake of the RBI in the fixed income and derivatives market arises
on account of several reasons. First, RBI as a monetary authority is most concerned
with the transmission of monetary policy. Second, it must be recognised that
in the Indian conditions, we are neither a closed economy nor an open economy.
In reality, we are an opening economy and a careful management of the process
of opening is critical for growth and stability. Third, for the Reserve Bank
of India, as the central bank, financial stability is one of the increasingly
important considerations and an important subset of the financial stability
is determined by the stability in the external sector. Fourth, government securities
market, which is currently the dominant segment of the fixed income markets,
is also a legitimate concern for the Central Bank, since it provides the benchmark
interest rates. The government securities market, in our setting, has policy
signalling although the rates are largely market determined. Fifth, the Reserve
Bank of India is a regulator of the banks and also of the primary dealers, which
together constitute large holders of Government papers. Hence, there is a significant
linkage between RBI’s prudential regulations and the fixed income markets. Finally,
in an economy like ours which is attempting structural transformation, RBI has
to have a developmental role also, apart from being a regulator of money markets,
Government securities markets and forex markets. It is in this context that
the Reserve Bank of India goes into close interactive mode with organisations
like FIMMDA and PDAI.
RBI’s developmental role in the context
of Self Regulatory Organisations (SROs), is perhaps worth exploring at some
length. A good beginning may be the Report of the Advisory Group on Securities
Market Regulation, 2001 (Chairman: Shri Deepak Parekh) which made certain observations
on self regulation by the SROs and the RBI. The relevant extract from Section
2.4 reads as follows:
"Further, the slow evolution of
the Association of Mutual Funds of India (AMFI) as a SRO has meant continuation
of substantial regulatory burden on SEBI. In this regard, the Group suggests
that SEBI assist the AMFI to develop into a full-fledged SRO. Similarly,
in money and government securities markets, Fixed Income Money Market and
Derivatives Association of India (FIMMDA) and Primary Dealers Association
of India (PDAI) are operating as industry level associations, who are gradually
taking on the role of SROs. There is as yet no regulatory oversight of the
RBI over these emerging SROs. However, to facilitate these associations
to emerge as full-fledged SROs, the RBI is engaging them in a consultative
process, which needs to be further intensified. On their part, to promote
integrity of the markets, FIMMDA and PDAI need to establish a comprehensive
code of conduct and best practices in securities transactions and also have
a mechanism to enforce such codes. The RBI can play a supportive role here".
There has been a recent review (December
2004) of the recommendations of the Advisory Groups constituted by the Standing
Committee on International Financial Standards and Codes published in January
2005 RBI Bulletin. An extract from this "Report on the Progress and Agenda
Ahead" is useful, though, as the disclaimer says, it is an assessment by
the professional staff of the RBI and not necessarily the view of the Reserve
Bank:
"The proposal to accord legal status
as an SRO to FIMMDA has been examined in detail by RBI and was not found
feasible at present. However, FIMMDA has established a code of conduct and
undertaken related responsibilities appropriate to an industrial body. According
self-regulatory status to PDAI is a non-issue since all PDAI members are
also members of FIMMDA".
There are several concepts which are addressed
in the Reports cited, in particular, `industry body’; `Self Regulatory Organisation’
and `legal status as SRO’. There is considerable merit in debating these concepts
and their relevance to FIMMDA, keeping in view the way forward that is being
contemplated in the conference today.
Self-regulation has a long history of working
effectively. Some of the earliest signs of self-regulation were evident in the
utterance of the Hippocratic oath by the medical professionals at the time of
their graduation. Almost a thousand years ago, Maghribi traders had probably
one of the first self-regulatory schemes based on market incentives for regulating
their trade. The Maghribi were Jewish traders who lived in the Abbasasid caliphate
(centered in Baghdad) until the first half of the tenth century, when they emigrated
to North Africa. They operated through business associates to handle some of
their business dealings abroad. Merchants could never be sure that agents actually
handed over the entire proceeds of business done abroad on their behalf. Courts
were generally unable to verify agents’ claims and actions or track down an
agent who absconded with the merchant’s money. The Maghribi traders solved the
problem by organizing themselves into a coalition that served as a grapevine
for information on honest and dishonest agents. Any agents who treated a member
unfairly could never hope to do business again with other members. In Europe,
in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, as more and more rural folk moved to
towns and cities, a new class of merchants emerged to meet the demands of the
growing urban population. It was during this period that the basic concepts
and institutions of modern Western mercantile law (lex mercatoria) were
formed.
The self-regulation has evolved significantly
since then and linkages with regulatory authorities, often on a sound legal
basis, were established mainly in the financial sector. Self-regulation generally
imposes lower cost than official regulation whenever a shift is feasible. SROs
possess the flexibility to adapt to regulatory requirements of rapidly changing
business environment. They provide an intimate knowledge of the markets and
products. Self-regulation, typically involving a unique combination of private
interests with government or regulatory oversight over them, is an effective
and efficient form of regulation for the complex, dynamic and ever-changing
financial services industry. The role of self-regulation and, indeed, its very
existence, differs from country to country, across market sectors and across
the developed and emerging markets. In its most complete form, self-regulation
encompasses the authority to create, amend, implement and enforce rules of conduct
with respect to the entities subject to the SRO’s jurisdiction, and to resolve
disputes through arbitration or other means.
The advantages of self-regulation are very
clear, especially in terms of minimising the cost of regulation as well as cost
of compliance of regulation in the financial sector, while improving the quality
of regulation. However, there are a number of issues particularly in the financial
sector which are often cited. For instance, there is a well-known observation
about the "regulatory capture", that is, the regulated entities, in
the organised form, have a tendency to capture the regulator to protect their
own interests. It is also argued that the SROs protect the interests of the
members if they are in conflict with interests of the system. In this regard,
I find that the model for effective regulation, brought out in the Report of
the SRO Consultative Committee of the International Organization of Securities
Commissions in May 2000, is useful. Perhaps these issues will also be addressed
in this Conference as part of the way forward.
Let me again thank the organisers for giving
me this opportunity and wish the Conference all success.
* Inaugural Address by Dr. Y.V. Reddy at the Fixed Income and Money market & Derivatives Association of Indian and Primary Dealers Association of India delivered on March 11, 2005 at Mumbai