The stability of the banking sector deteriorated marginally in the period since September 2011. The soundness
indicators of banks, however, remained robust. Asset quality pressures persisted while credit growth decelerated,
largely reflecting the slowdown in the economy. As the divergence between credit and deposit growth widened,
banks’ reliance on borrowed funds increased, heightening associated liquidity risks. Going into 2012-13, the
operating conditions for the Indian banks are expected to remain challenging given the weakening global
economic outlook, adverse domestic macroeconomic conditions and policy uncertainties. Banks in India are
likely to be affected due to deleveraging in advanced countries though the direct impact is expected to be limited.
Credit growth of the non banking financial companies has decelerated. Regulatory restraints have been put
in place to rein in the risks posed by exposure of banks to gold loan companies. The stress tests carried out on
banks, incorporating a range of shocks, revealed deterioration in their capital position as compared with the
baseline scenario, but the banking system remained resilient even under extreme stress scenarios. A series of
scenarios and sensitivity stress tests applied on select banks’ derivatives portfolio revealed that they are well
positioned to manage the resultant market risks.
Soundness of Financial Institutions
Banking Stability Map and Indicator1
Risks to the banking sector remain elevated
3.1 Vulnerabilities in the banking sector exhibited a
mixed trend at the end of March 2012 as revealed by the
Banking Stability Map. The soundness and profitability
indicators showed some improvement over the position
as at end September 2011. Soundness indicators,
however, showed a deterioration vis-à-vis their position in March 2011. Strains in asset quality intensified. The
liquidity deficit added to the stress in the banking sector
(Chart 3.1).
3.2 The Banking Stability Indicator, as at end March
2012, pointed to deterioration in the stability of the
banking sector, compared with its position in September
2011. A forecast of the indicator for the next two quarters
surmised that the risks to the banking sector are likely
to remain elevated in the near term (Chart 3.2).
Deleveraging trends in global banking expected to
continue...
3.3 The confluence of funding strains and sovereign
risks led to fears of a precipitous deleveraging process
that could hurt financial markets and the wider economy
via asset sales and contractions in credit (Chapters I and
II). Many European banks have announced mediumterm
business plans for reducing assets. The impact is
likely to differ significantly across regions, with larger
effects expected in emerging Europe than in Asia or Latin
America (Table 3.1). In the Indian context, the claims of
European banks, amounting to US$ 146 billion, formed
53 per cent of total consolidated foreign claims. Of
this, 56 per cent pertained to claims of banks in United
Kingdom.
… with limited impact possible for domestic credit
availability
3.4 The direct impact of the Eurozone crisis on
Indian banks is expected to be limited. The Indian
banking sector is dominated by domestic banks with
foreign banks accounting for only 8 per cent of total
banking sector assets and 5 per cent of banking sector
credit. There could, however, be indirect impact on
Indian banks due to their exposures to other countries,
especially in the Eurozone (Charts 3.3 and 3.4).
3.5 The direct impact of deleveraging is not expected
to be significant on domestic credit availability although
specialised types of financing like structured long term
finance, project finance and trade finance could be
impacted.
Table 3.1 : Consolidated Foreign Claims of European Banks (in US$ billion) |
|
Jun-2011 |
Dec-2011 |
Developing Europe |
1304 |
1137 |
Developing Asia and Pacific |
935 |
841 |
of which, India |
159 |
146 |
Developing Latin America and Caribbean |
855 |
770 |
Source : Locational Banking Statistics - Dec 2011, BIS |
Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCBs)
Credit and deposit growth weakens, reverberating
slowdown concerns in the economy
3.6 Balance sheet of SCBs expanded by 14.5 per cent
during 2011-12, lower than the growth of 18.8 per cent
for 2010-11. The deceleration was reflected in the growth
rates of both credit and deposits. Credit growth in the
banking sector, at 16.3 per cent in 2011-12, was lower
than the 22.6 per cent recorded in 2010-11. Deposit
growth stood at 13.7 per cent and 17.7 per cent for the
two years respectively. The growth rate of deposits in
2011-12 was the lowest recorded in the past 10 years.
3.7 These trends broadly reflected the slowdown in
the economy, as the nominal GDP growth decelerated
from 18.8 per cent in 2010-11 to 15.4 per cent in
2011-12. Benchmarking of the interest rates on small
savings schemes to market determined rates of interest
as well as availability of liquid funds with higher yield
and associated tax benefits may have also contributed
to the deceleration in growth rate of deposits of banks.
Slowdown in credit driven by slowdown in some
specific sectors…
3.8 The deceleration in credit growth was particularly
marked in case of the priority sector, real estate and
infrastructure segments, which together account for
nearly 60 per cent of banking sector credit (Chart 3.5).
… and amongst public sector banks
3.9 The deceleration was most pronounced in the
credit growth of Public Sector Banks (PSBs) while the old
private sector banks recorded a sharper credit growth of
24 per cent. Expansion of credit to retail and real estate
sectors accounted for the bulk of the growth in credit
among the old private sector banks – a trend which would
need to be carefully monitored, if sustained (Chart 3.6).
CD ratio increased consequent on divergence between
credit and deposit growth rates …
3.10 The credit to deposit (CD) ratio increased to 76
per cent as at end March 2012 (as against 73.5 per cent
as at end September 2011 and 74.3 per cent as at end
March 2011) driven by the divergence between deposit
and credit growth rates in 2011-12. The incremental CD
ratio also remained high at 88 per cent. The incremental
Investment to Deposit (ID) ratio rose sharply on the back
of a 17 per cent growth in investments (Chart 3.7).
… and banks’ reliance on borrowed funds increased
3.11 Banks, during 2011-12, increasingly relied on
borrowings to fund their credit and investment growth.
This was evidenced by the increasing gap between the
combined growth of advances and investments and that
of deposits and capital (Chart 3.8). This was accompanied
by the growing short term maturity mismatches in the
balance sheet of banks (Chart 3.9). The rollover and
liquidity risks associated with these trends will need to
be assessed and managed.
Capital ratios recover as credit growth slows
3.12 The capital ratios of the SCBs improved marginally
since September 2011, primarily due to slowdown
in growth of credit. There was, however, a marginal
deterioration in comparison with the position as on
March 2011. Capital to Risk weighted Assets Ratio
(CRAR) fell from 14.2 per cent as at end March 2011 to
13.5 per cent as at end September 2011, but recovered
to 14.1 per cent as at end March 2012. Core CRAR fell
from 10 per cent as at end March 2011 to 9.6 per cent
as at end September 2011, but rose to 10.3 per cent as
at end March 2012 (Chart 3.10).
Asset quality concerns persist as NPA ratios remain
high
3.13 Asset quality concerns persist as the growth in
non performing assets (NPAs) accelerated and continued
to outpace credit growth. The respondents of the second
Systemic Risk Survey conducted by the Reserve Bank
(Chapter V) also identified asset quality as one of the
critical risks faced by the Indian banking sector.
3.14 The Gross NPA ratio increased to 2.9 per cent as at
end March 2012, as against 2.4 per cent as at end March
2011 and 2.8 per cent as at end September 2011. Net
NPA ratio stood at 1.3 per cent as at end March 2012, as
against 0.9 per cent as at end March 2011 and 1.2 per
cent as at end September 2011. The ratio of NPAs (net of
provisions) to capital also falls short when benchmarked
against the peer economies (Chart 3.11).
Growth in NPAs outpaced credit growth by a wide
margin
3.15 NPAs grew at 43.9 per cent as at end March
2012, far outpacing credit growth of 16.3 per cent.
The divergence in growth rate of credit and NPAs has
widened in the recent period, which could put further
pressure on asset quality in the near term (Chart 3.12).
Accretions to NPAs accelerated
3.16 The slippage ratio3 increased to 2.1 per cent as at
end March 2012 from 1.6 per cent at March 2011 and
1.9 per cent at September 2011.The ratio of slippages
plus restructured standard advances to recoveries
(excluding up-gradations) also exhibited an increasing
trend underscoring the concerns with respect to asset
quality, and the need for proactive management of NPAs
by banks (Chart 3.13).
Restructuring of advances is on the increase…
3.17 Due to a spillover of the global financial
crisis to the Indian economy, certain relaxations 4
were permitted on restructuring on a temporary basis in
the later part of 2008-09, which helped in tiding over the
difficulties faced by the real sector. However, it led to a
significant increase in the level of restructured standard
assets during 2008-09 and 2009-10, after which there
was a deceleration in the amount of restructured assets.
In 2011-12, the quantum of restructured accounts has
again increased sharply, outpacing both credit growth
and growth rate of gross NPAs (Chart 3.14).
…and could weigh on NPA ratios, going forward
3.18 An empirical analysis of the asset quality of
banks’ advances portfolio was conducted by adding
back the advances written off by banks during the last
five years and (separately) assuming that 15 per cent of
restructured accounts slip into impaired category. The
resultant ratios exhibited an increasing trend that calls
for a closer look at the underlying management of NPAs
by banks (Chart 3.15).
Asset quality in some key sectors remained under
strain
3.19 The increase in gross NPAs for the year ending
March 2012 was largely contributed by some key sectors
viz., priority sector, retail and real estate. The growth
rate of NPAs in the infrastructure segment, however,
decelerated as at end March 2012, partially on account
of base effects and sharp moderation in credit to
infrastructure projects (Table 3.2 and Chart 3.16). Certain
sectors like power and airlines saw significant increase
in impairments (Box 3.1).
Box 3.1 : Power and Airlines : Sectors under Stress5
The risks faced by banks on their exposure to the power
sector due to rising losses and debt levels in state electricity
boards (SEBs) and the shortage of fuel availability for power
generation were discussed in the FSR for December 2011.
Potential pressures on asset quality have intensified with
restructuring in bank credit to power sector registering a
sharp increase, especially in the last quarter of 2011-12,
even as impairments as a ratio of outstanding credit has
moderated. Meanwhile, the losses of SEBs have also been
mounting6, adding to the concerns about asset quality in the
sector (Charts 3.17 and 3.18).
 |
 |
Asset quality of banks’ credit to the airlines industry came
under some stress in recent periods, driven largely by the
performance of some specific airline companies. Sharp increases in impairment and restructuring in the sector saw
the share of this sector in aggregate banking system NPA
and restructured assets rise disproportionate to its share
in banking sector credit (Chart 3.19). There was significant
concentration discernible in distribution of credit to the
airline sector as ten banks accounted for almost 86 per cent
of total bank credit to this sector. As at end-March 2012,
nearly three quarters of the advances of banks, which have
an exposure of above `10 billion to the airline industry, were
either impaired or restructured. PSBs accounted for the major
share of these exposures (Chart 3.20).
 |
 |
Going forward, the sectors are likely to continue facing
funding constraints and could also be affected by prevalent
policy uncertainties. These could pose challenges to the asset
quality of credit to these sectors.
Further strains on asset quality could emerge; though
the strong capital position provides cushion
3.20 The muted economic backdrop and global
headwinds could lead to further deterioration in asset
quality. The position is not alarming at the current
juncture and some comfort is provided by the strong
capital adequacy of banks which ensure that the
banking system remains resilient even in the unlikely
contingenc y of having to absorb the entire existing stock
of NPAs (Chart 3.21). A series of credit risk stress tests
also testify to the resilience of banks (paragraphs 3.43
to 3.45).
Profitability indicators display mixed trends
3.21 SCBs continued to register healthy profits, though
the growth rate of earnings has decelerated (Chart 3.22).
Return on assets (RoA), return on equity (RoE) and net
interest margin (NIM) have declined marginally as at end
March 2012, relative to end March 2011 (Chart 3.23).
Going forward, the growth of earnings could be affected
due to lower credit off-take and asset quality concerns.
Interest rate swaps dominate off balance sheet assets
of banks
3.22 The aggregate notional amount of off balance
sheet (OBS) assets of the SCBs far exceeded the size
of their on-balance sheet assets (Chart 3.24). The
distribution of total OBS assets (in terms of notional
amount) showed concentration of about 64 per cent in
foreign banks followed by 17 per cent in case of PSBs. In
the case of derivatives, foreign banks constituted 70 per cent of total notional amount, followed by new private
sector banks at 16 per cent. Among the OBS constituents,
the most prominent segment was Interest Rate Swaps
(IRS).
Banks geared to absorb market risks from their
derivatives portfolio; will need to manage the resultant
credit risks
3.23 An analysis of derivatives portfolio of a sample
of banks7 revealed that most banks reported a positive
net mark-to-market (MTM) position. The dominance of
foreign banks in the derivatives segment was evident
as the proportion of gross positive as well as negative
MTM to capital stood, on an average, at around 250 per
cent for foreign banks compared with 16 per cent in case
of the other banks in the sample. Net MTM as a ratio
of capital varied between a positive of 30 per cent to a
negative of 10 per cent (Charts 3.25 and 3.26).
3.24 A series of stress tests was carried out on the
derivatives portfolio by the select banks based on
a common set of historical scenarios and random
sensitivity shocks (Box 3.2). The post-stress net MTM
position was positive for most banks suggesting that
the banks are well geared to absorb adverse market
movements. However, banks remained exposed to
the risks of counterparty failure, especially in case
of disputes with clients over payment, as had been
evidenced in the past.
Non Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs)
Credit growth decelerated amidst declining asset
quality and profitability
3.25 NBFCs experienced deceleration in growth
rate of credit though the credit growth continued to
outpace that of the banking sector. Bank credit to NBFCs
accelerated as did the reliance of NBFCs on bank credit
as a source of funding. This could pose risks for NBFCs if
banks are not in a position or unwilling to extend credit
to the sector (Chart 3.27).
3.26 The financial soundness indicators of systemically
important non-deposit taking NBFCs (NBFC-ND-SIs)
revealed a deteriorating trend with respect to soundness,
asset quality and profitability (in terms of RoA). The
CRAR remained above the regulatory requirement of
15 per cent, though it declined over the review period, (Chart 3.32). The downward movement in CRAR could
partially be explained by the increasing asset base of the
NBFCs. Further, the RoA remained healthy at around
2 per cent.
Box 3.2 : Stress Testing of Derivatives Portfolio of Select Banks
A stress testing exercise on derivatives portfolio of
a cross section of banks was undertaken. The stress
tests consisted of six historical scenarios and four
interest rate and exchange rate sensitivity shocks8.
The impact of the tests exhibited considerable
variance across banks and across bank groups. In terms of increase in negative MTM, foreign banks
were impacted significantly while the impact on
the rest of the bank groups was muted. Further,
the shocks used for sensitivity analysis caused the
maximum stress, in case of most banks, relative to
the historical scenarios (Charts 3.28 and 3.29).
 |
 |
The impact on the net MTM positions of banks in
the sample, post application of the stress conditions,
was observed to be relatively muted in most cases.
The shocks used for sensitivity analysis caused
the maximum stress for most banks relative to
the historical scenarios with the average change in Net MTM being around 344 per cent for the
sensitivity analysis compared with 66 per cent
for scenario analysis. However, there were a few
outlier banks where the impact was significant and
these banks would need to carefully manage the
underlying risks (Charts 3.30 and 3.31).
Rapid rise of gold loan companies could be a cause
of concern
3.27 The exponential growth in balance sheets of
NBFCs engaged in lending against gold in recent years coupled with the rapid rise in gold prices along with
expansion in the number of their branches could be a
cause of concern (Box 3.3). The gold loan companies 9
exhibited high dependency on the banking system for
their resources which could pose risks to the banks, in
case the business model of these companies falters. This
growing interconnectedness of gold loan companies
with banks was sought to be addressed through recent
regulatory measures viz., the de-recognition of priority sector status of bank finance to NBFCs for on-lending
against gold jewellery and through the prescription of a
lower exposure limits on bank finance to NBFCs. Further,
as a prudential measure, the Reserve Bank also directed
the gold loan companies to maintain a minimum Loanto-
Value (LTV) ratio of 60 per cent for loans granted
against the collateral of gold jewellery and a minimum
Tier I capital of 12 per cent by April 1, 2014.
Box 3.3 : Gold Loan Companies and Associated Risks
Lending against the collateral of gold is not a recent
phenomenon, though there has been a spurt in this activity in
recent years with NBFCs emerging as prominent players in the
market for ‘gold loans’. The share of NBFCs in total gold loans
extended by all financial institutions, showed a marked increase
between March 2010 and 2011. Individuals are the largest
borrowers against gold from NBFCs and account for 95 per cent
of the total gold loans.
The data related to these NBFCs shows that the total asset size
increased sharply from ` 54.8 billion as at end March 2009 to
` 445.1 billion as at end March 31, 2012. The growth has largely
been accompanied by an escalation in borrowings. There is
significant concentration among the companies, as the growth
in advances is mainly contributed by two companies. The
borrowings of these two companies increased by nearly
200 per cent between March 2010 and 2011.
Nevertheless, there are several concerns pertaining to this
segment of the NBFC sector. The main concerns being:
(i) Concentration Risk
With more than 90 per cent of the loan assets being
collateralised by only one product viz. gold jewellery, the
business model of gold loan companies has inherent concentration risks. The risks, however, would materialise
only in case of a steep adverse movement in gold prices.
(ii) Operational Risk
The gold loan companies thrive on the promises of
disbursement of quick /easy loan. Considering the extremely
speedy disbursal being promised by these companies,
quality of due diligence including adherence to Know Your
Customer (KYC) norms, establishing ownership and quality
of the gold, etc. could be compromised.
(iii) Concerns on Private Placement of NCDs on a Retail Basis
The gold loan companies have resorted to frequent
issuances of short term retail non convertible debentures
(NCDs), especially through private placement for meeting
their credit needs. Concerns arise as some of these NCDs
carry the features of ‘public deposits’, but these entities
are not regulated in a manner akin to deposit taking NBFCs.
(iv) Reliance on borrowings, especially bank funds
The business model of the gold loan companies is driven
by borrowings, of which, bank finance forms the major
component and is increasing at a fast rate. Any adverse
development in recovery by these NBFCs or an adverse
movement in gold prices may have a spill-over impact on
the asset quality of the banks.
Urban Co-operative Banks (UCBs)
UCBs show improvement in performance
3.28 The performance of Scheduled UCBs (SUCBs) as
at end March 2012 has shown improvement during the
review period (Chart 3.33).
Regional Rural Banks (RRBs)
Strain in asset quality evident
3.29 RRBs, which constituted about 1.5 per cent of the
assets of the financial system, showed robust growth as
at end March 2012, even as asset quality deteriorated
(Charts 3.34 and 3.35).
Insurance Sector10
Non life sector indicated robust growth while life
sector declined
3.30 The non life insurance industry grew by
23.2 per cent, at end March 2012, as against a growth of
22.4 per cent as at end March 2011. The life insurance industry showed a decline of 9.2 per cent in the first
year premium collected in 2011-12, against a growth of
15.1 per cent in 2010-11.
Challenges lie ahead in wake of Solvency II regime
3.31 The Indian insurance sector is governed by a
factor based solvency regime which is comparable to
Solvency I 11. This framework is rule based and reflects
various risks at the industry level while implicit margins
embedded in various elements for valuing assets,
liabilities and solvency margins make the solvency
framework prudent and robust.
3.32 Solvency II is a risk-based regulatory regime that
will apply to almost all insurance establishments in the
European Union (EU). The regime introduces economic
risk-based solvency requirements and aims to bring in a
change in perception that capital is not the only mitigant
against failures. Instead of statutory provisioning,
Solvency II provides for provisioning based on the
(market consistent) ‘Best Estimate’. Given that the joint
venture partners of a number of insurance companies
operating in India are EU based entities, the Indian
operations have also been assessed for the purpose of
Solvency II. While the level of preparedness of these
entities would be much higher, greater challenges exist
with respect to the public sector insurers both in the
life and non-life segments.
3.33 The current capital regime in India is not in
complete consonance with Solvency II and embarking on
the framework would necessitate addressing a range of
challenges in terms of assessment of risks, development
of internal models, adequacy of data, capacity building
both within IRDA and in the insurance industry. As a
first step in this direction, IRDA has set up a Committee
to examine the solvency regime in select jurisdictions
and to make its recommendations on the Solvency II
regime in India.
Pension Funds12
3.34 India’s pension ecosystem is enormous and is
growing rapidly. At one end of the spectrum are Defined
Benefit (DB) pension schemes of which the two main
schemes are the pre-reform civil services pension scheme of the Centre/states (which has been replaced
by the National Pension System for the new recruits)
and the ‘organised sector’ social security scheme
operationalised by the Employees’ Provident Fund
Organisation (EPFO). Besides, in the defined benefit
category, there are a number of schemes which are run
by the central and state governments, of which the
largest is the Indira Gandhi National Old Age Pension
Scheme. The state governments run a number of
occupational pension schemes, a large number of which,
relate to the trades in the unorganised sector and mainly
target the population below the poverty line.
3.35 At the other end of the spectrum are the Defined
Contribution (DC) Schemes of which the National
Pension System (NPS) introduced from January 2004 is
the most important addition to the Indian pension
sector. The NPS was initially introduced as a replacement
pension scheme for the civil services. The scheme was
first adopted by the central government and then by the
state governments, except for West Bengal, Kerala and
Tripura. In 2009, the NPS was extended to the private
sector and, in 2010, the Government of India introduced
a co-contribution scheme (called ‘Swavalamban’) on the
NPS platform for the unorganised sector. The DC space
is also populated by a number of schemes that are run
by insurance companies for private individuals and
corporates.
3.36 In the case of the DB schemes, the biggest
challenge is the quantification of the liabilities. Since
the pre-2004 pension scheme is indexed to inflation and
wage increases recommended by the Pay Commission,
it becomes difficult to project the pay-outs far into the
future. The problem is compounded by the fact that it
is a ‘Pay As You Go’ system which implies that this is an
unfunded liability. Any large increase in the pension
liability will have a direct impact on the fiscal deficit. The
2012-13 budget estimated a total outflow of `631 billion
on pensions and retirement benefits of central
government employees alone, which is an increase of
12 per cent over the revised estimate of `561 billion in
2011-12. In the 1970s and 1980s, recruitment by the
Government expanded rapidly, though it was contained in the 1990s. Pension payments to the recruits of earlier
decades will soon start looming large. The outflows are
expected to rise as the cohort of recruits between 1970s
and 1980s retire. In the case of the EPFO, it is a DB
scheme which is partially funded by the contributions
made by the employer and the employee. However, since
the benefits are fixed and are sticky downwards, any
shortfall will have to be made good by the
Government. According to the Report of the Expert
Committee on Employees’ Pension Scheme (EPS), 199513,
there is underfunding in the EPS at the present rate of
contributions and sustainability of the scheme would
require upward revisions. Moreover, the Employees’
Pension Fund had a corpus of about `1420 billion as on
March 31, 2011. The large magnitude is a pointer to
systemic risk, if magnitude is any criteria. In the case of
several DB schemes, currently under implementation
and newly announced, the lack of liability computation
especially in a world of rising life expectancy can be a
potential source of fiscal stress in years where there are
large payouts.
3.37 Identifying systemic risks for DC pension systems
is a challenge as prima-facie, one does not find reasons
when all the risks are transferred and diffused to a large
number of subscribers whose benefits are left undefined,
by definition. The task becomes more challenging when
the pension regulator has a limited mandate to regulate
only the National Pension System and no identification
methodology for systemic risks is available and
implemented. The miniscule size of NPS intuitively
renders negligible possibilities or potentials of posing
any systemic risk. The NPS (a Defined Contributionunprotected),
by definition, rules out the requirement
of solvency or capital requirement related stress test. At
best, some kind of scenario analysis can be contemplated,
not from the perspective of systemic risk threat but for
effectively addressing public disclosure risk issues. This
is specifically relevant for the return and benefit
projection on which illustrations could be based. A
sensitivity testing could also be relevant when the risk
of a particular factor is tested on an institution or
portfolio (such as equity market decline or adverse
interest rate movements). Similarly a full range of stress tests covering broad range of modeling techniques can
be contemplated to effectively communicate the risks
passed on to the subscribers using historical scenarios
or hypothetical (usually extreme) events. The modeling
can be deterministic or stochastic.
3.38 International standard setting organisations such
as International Association of Insurance Supervisors
(IAIS) and Bank for International Settlements (BIS) have
outlined two main roles for stress testing: (a) To ascertain
whether financial institutions have sufficient financial
resources to meet their commitments (not required for
DC pensions which do not have set liabilities to meet)
(b) As a general risk management tool, which can be
used to ascertain the impact of various factors or
scenarios on financial institutions (DC pensions do not
have capital requirements).
3.39 However, stress tests can help to develop and
assess alternative strategies for mitigating risks. There
could be three different uses of stress tests. First, the
pension supervisor can analyse the results of tests
undertaken by pension funds as a part of general
oversight. Second, supervisors can impose standard tests
for all supervised entities for comparative purposes or
to establish the state of the industry as a whole. Third,
supervisor could optionally request particular tests to
be imposed on specific institutions where they have
concerns. At present, internationally, there is no
guidance available to be drawn from the comparative
analysis on the elements and factors that should be
considered by both pension funds and pension
supervisors in designing, applying and evaluating stress
testing models.
3.40 Similar to the rigorous exercises undertaken by
the Expert Committee, the conventional broad range of
modeling techniques and solvency related tests can be
applied to these DB pension plans to ensure that
government has sufficient financial resources to meet
their (future) commitments. Stress tests with respect to
particular risk factors (such as general economic decline,
interest rate movements, inflation) can help to develop
and assess alternative strategies for mitigating risk.
Resilience of Financial Institutions
3.41 The resilience of the financial institutions was
assessed through a series of stress tests which imparted
extreme but plausible shocks14 based on supervisory data
pertaining to end-March 2012. The resilience of SCBs to
various stress scenarios was tested using both the top
down and the bottom up approaches as also through a
series of macro stress tests15. A number of single factor
sensitivity stress tests were also carried out on scheduled
UCBs and NBFC-ND-SIs (Non deposit taking systemically
important NBFCs) to assess their vulnerabilities and
resilience under various scenarios.
Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCBs)
3.42 A series of top down stress tests incorporating
credit, foreign exchange, equity, interest rate and
liquidity risks were carried out for the banking system
(60 SCBs comprising 99 per cent of total banking sector
assets). The same set of shocks were used by 25 select
SCBs (comprising about 75 per cent of total assets) to
conduct bottom up stress tests. The bottom up stress
tests broadly reflected the results of the top down stress
tests and reconfirmed the resilience of the banking
system to a wide range of shocks.
Credit risk remains the main source of vulnerability
for SCBs
3.43 The impact of shocks under different credit
risk scenarios for banks as on March 2012 shows that
the system level CRAR remained above the required
minimum of 9 per cent and the system is reasonably
poised to withstand the shocks; although some banks,
including a few large banks, could be under stress as
their CRAR would fall below 9 per cent (Table 3.3 and
Chart 3.36).
Banks remain resilient to sectoral credit risk shocks
3.44 The analysis of a credit risk shock emanating
from important sectors viz. agriculture, power, real
estate, telecom and priority sector revealed that the
maximum impact was seen in the case of shocks to the
priority sector followed by shocks to the real estate and
agriculture sectors. The banks were, however, able to
absorb the shocks (Table 3.4).
Table 3.3 : Credit Risk: Gross Credit - Impact on Capital and NPAs |
(Except number of banks, figures are in per cent) |
|
System Level |
Impacted Banks
(CRAR < 9%) |
Impacted Banks
(Core CRAR < 6%) |
CRAR |
Core
CRAR |
NPA
Ratio |
Number
of Banks |
Share in
Total
Assets |
Number
of Banks |
Share
in Total
Assets |
Baseline: |
All Banks |
14.1 |
10.3 |
2.9 |
– |
– |
– |
– |
Select 60 Banks |
13.9 |
10.1 |
2.8 |
– |
– |
– |
– |
Shock 1: |
11.9 |
7.9 |
5.8 |
5 |
6.7 |
11 |
30.0 |
Shock 2: |
11.1 |
7.2 |
7.2 |
12 |
30.2 |
18 |
41.9 |
Shock 3: |
12.7 |
8.8 |
4.2 |
3 |
1.5 |
4 |
6.5 |
Shock 1: NPAs increase by 100 per cent |
Shock 2: NPAs increase by 150 per cent |
Shock 3: NPAs increase due to 40 per cent of restructured standard advances turning NPAs |
Source: Supervisory Data and RBI staff calculations |
 |
Table 3.4 : Credit Risk: Sectoral – Impact on Capital and NPAs |
(Per cent) |
|
System Level |
CRAR |
Core CRAR |
NPA Ratio |
Baseline: |
All Banks |
14.1 |
10.3 |
2.9 |
Select 60 Banks |
13.9 |
10.1 |
2.8 |
Shock: 5 percentage points increase in NPAs in each sector |
Power |
13.7 |
9.8 |
3.2 |
Telecommunication |
13.8 |
10.0 |
3.0 |
Agriculture |
13.4 |
9.6 |
3.5 |
Real Estate |
13.3 |
9.4 |
3.7 |
All 4 Sectors : Agriculture + Power + Real Estate + Telecom |
12.6 |
8.8 |
4.7 |
Priority Sector |
12.8 |
8.9 |
4.4 |
Source: Supervisory Data and RBI staff calculations |
Credit concentration risk was not significant
3.45 A study of the concentration of credit portfolio
of banks revealed that, at the system level, the
concentration appeared moderate, though the degree
of concentration was higher in some individual banks
(Table 3.5). The average exposure of the banks to the
largest group borrower stood at 4.7 per cent of total
advances. The maximum exposure was, however, much
higher at 26.1 per cent.
Banks able to withstand interest rate shocks
3.46 The resilience of SCBs to shocks involving both
parallel and non-parallel shifts in the yield curve was
assessed. The tests were carried out separately for the
banking and trading books. The results carried out on the
trading book suggest that the impact of interest rate risk
would be limited and no bank is impacted adversely. The
results of the banking book also suggest that the banking
system could withstand the assumed stressed scenarios,
though the CRAR of some individual banks slip below
the regulatory minimum. The impact is maximum in
case of a parallel upward shift of the INR yield curve by
250 basis points (bps) (Table 3.6 and Chart 3.37).
Impact of adverse exchange rate and equity price
movements would be limited
3.47 The impact, of appreciation/depreciation of
currencies by 10/20 per cent, on banks’ individual net
open bilateral currency positions was assessed. The
stress tests results indicate that the impact will not be
significant. The impact of a fall in the equity prices by 40
per cent on banks’ capital revealed that the shock has a
marginal impact as the equity market exposure of banks
was not very significant. The system level CRAR fell to
13.4 per cent, under stress, from the baseline of 14.1
per cent. For all banks, the post-stress CRAR remained
above 9 per cent.
SLR investments key in mitigating liquidity risks
3.48 Stress scenarios assessing the resilience of banks
to liquidity risk16 evidenced deterioration in the liquidity
position of some banks. The availability of Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) investments, however, helped the
banks to ward off the liquidity pressure (Table 3.7).
Table 3.5 : Credit Risk: Concentration- Impact on Capital and NPAs |
(Except number of banks, figures are in per cent) |
|
System Level |
Impacted Banks
(CRAR < 9%) |
Impacted Banks
(Core CRAR < 6%) |
CRAR |
Core
CRAR |
NPA
Ratio |
Number
of Banks |
Share in
Total
Assets |
Number
of Banks |
Share
in Total
Assets |
Baseline: |
All Banks |
14.1 |
10.3 |
2.9 |
- |
- |
- |
- |
Select 60 Banks |
13.9 |
10.1 |
2.8 |
- |
- |
- |
- |
Shock 1 |
12.7 |
8.8 |
5.6 |
1 |
0.19 |
1 |
3.0 |
Shock 2 |
12.2 |
8.3 |
7.8 |
1 |
0.19 |
2 |
5.1 |
Shock 3 |
11.6 |
7.7 |
10.6 |
1 |
0.19 |
9 |
30.4 |
Shock 4 |
12.3 |
8.4 |
7.5 |
1 |
0.19 |
2 |
5.1 |
Shock 1: Top individual borrower defaults
Shock 2: Top two individual borrowers default
Shock 3: Top three individual borrowers default
Shock 4: Top group borrower defaults |
Source: Supervisory Data and RBI staff calculations |
Table 3.6 : Interest Rate Risk: Banking Book-Impact on Banks |
(Except number of banks, figures are in per cent) |
|
System Level |
Impacted Banks
(CRAR < 9%) |
Impacted Banks
(Core CRAR < 6%) |
CRAR |
Core
CRAR |
Number
of Banks |
Share in
Total
Assets |
Number
of Banks |
Share
in Total
Assets |
Baseline: |
All Banks |
14.1 |
10.3 |
– |
– |
– |
– |
Select 50 Banks |
13.9 |
10.1 |
– |
– |
– |
– |
Net Impact on Banking Book (Earnings + Portfolio) |
Shock 1 |
10.9 |
7.1 |
16 |
25.9 |
18 |
41.3 |
Shock 2 |
13.9 |
10.1 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
Shock 3 |
13.4 |
9.6 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
Shock 4 |
12.0 |
8.3 |
3 |
3.4 |
7 |
10.5 |
Income Impact on Banking Book (Earnings) |
Shock 1 |
13.8 |
10.0 |
1 |
1.8 |
1 |
1.8 |
Shock 2 |
13.9 |
10.1 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
Shock 3 |
13.8 |
10.1 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
Shock 4 |
13.8 |
10.0 |
1 |
1.8 |
1 |
1.8 |
Valuation Impact on Banking Book (Duration Gap Analysis) |
Shock 1 |
11.0 |
7.2 |
14 |
23.1 |
17 |
40.2 |
Shock 2 |
13.9 |
10.1 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
Shock 3 |
13.4 |
9.7 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
Shock 4 |
12.1 |
8.4 |
2 |
1.5 |
7 |
10.2 |
Shock 1: Parallel upward shift in INR yield curve by 250 bps
Shock 2: Parallel downward shift by 250 bps
Shock 3: Steepening of the INR yield curve, with interest rates increasing by 100
bps linearly spread between 1-month maturity and more than 10 year
maturity
Shock 4: Inversion of the INR yield curve with one-year rates shifting upwards
linearly by 250 bps and 10-year rates dropping by 100 bps |
Source: Supervisory Data and RBI staff calculations |
 |
Bottom-up stress tests also reflect resilience of the
banking system
3.49 The results of the bottom up stress tests carried
out by select banks (paragraph 3.42) also testified to the
general resilience of the banks to the different kinds
of sensitivity analysis. As in the case of the top down
stress tests, the impact of the stress tests were relatively
more severe on some banks with their post-stress
CRAR position falling below the regulatory minimum
(Chart 3.38).
Table 3.7 : Liquidity Risk: Impact on Banks |
(Except number of banks, figures are in per cent) |
|
Liquid Assets Definition |
Banks Facing Deficit |
Liquid Assets Ratio |
No. of Banks
|
Deposits Share |
Assets Share |
Baseline: 1 |
Cash, Excess CRR, Inter-bank-deposits, All-SLR-Investments |
22.9 |
Shock 1: |
10 per cent total deposit withdrawal 30 days |
0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
14.2 |
Shock 2: |
3 per cent deposit withdrawal each day for 5 days |
0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
11.0 |
Baseline: 2 |
Cash, Excess CRR, Inter-bank-deposits-maturing-within-1-month and Investments-maturing-within-1-month |
7.4 |
Shock 1: |
10 per cent total deposit withdrawal 30 days |
40 |
85.4 |
81.2 |
-2.8 |
Shock 2: |
3 per cent deposit withdrawal each day for 5 days |
44 |
90.7 |
87.0 |
-6.7 |
Baseline: 3 |
Cash, Excess CRR, Inter-bank-deposits-maturing-within-1-month, Excess SLR |
3.1 |
Shock 1: |
10 per cent total deposit withdrawal 30 days |
57 |
99.9 |
99.6 |
-7.7 |
Shock 2: |
3 per cent deposit withdrawal each day for 5 days |
57 |
99.9 |
99.6 |
-11.8 |
Baseline: 4 |
Cash, CRR, Inter-bank-1mon, Inv-1mon |
11.2 |
Shock 1: |
10 per cent total deposit withdrawal 30 days |
26 |
59.9 |
56.8 |
1.3 |
Shock 2: |
3 per cent deposit withdrawal each day for 5 days |
36 |
77.8 |
733 |
-2.4 |
Baseline: 5 |
Cash, CRR, Inter-bank-1mon, Excess SLR |
6.8 |
Shock 1: |
10 per cent total deposit withdrawal 30 days |
54 |
99.5 |
98.9 |
-3.5 |
Shock 2: |
3 per cent deposit withdrawal each day for 5 days |
57 |
99.9 |
99.6 |
-7.4 |
Source: Supervisory Returns and RBI staff calculations |
 |
Urban Co-operative Banks
UCBs vulnerable to credit risk shocks…
3.50 Stress tests on credit risk were carried out for
Scheduled UCBs (SUCBs) using their balance sheet data
as at end-March 2012. The impact of credit risk shocks on
the CRAR of the banks was assessed under two different
scenarios assuming an increase in the gross NPA ratio
by 50 per cent and 100 per cent respectively. The results
show that SUCBs could withstand shocks assumed under
the first scenario easily, though it would come under
some stress under the second scenario (Chart 3.39).
…as also to liquidity risks
3.51 Stress tests on liquidity risk were carried out
under two different scenarios assuming an increase in
cash outflows in the 1 to 28 days time bucket by 50 per
cent and 100 per cent respectively. It was assumed that
there were no changes in cash inflows under both the
scenarios. The banks were considered to be impacted
if, as a result of the stress, the mismatch or negative
gap (i.e. the cash inflow less cash outflow) in the 1 to
28 days time bucket exceeded 20 per cent of outflows.
The stress test results indicate that the SUCBs would be
significantly impacted even under the less severe stress
scenario (Chart 3.40).
Non-Banking Financial Companies
NBFCs able to withstand credit risk shocks
3.52 A stress test on credit risk for NBFC-ND-SI sector
for the period ended December 2011 was carried out
under two scenarios assuming an increase in gross NPA
by 200 per cent and 500 per cent respectively.
3.53 It was observed that, in the first scenario, CRAR
reduced marginally from 27.5 to 26.8 per cent, while
in the second scenario CRAR reduced to 24.3 per cent.
The sector, thus, remained resilient even to the more
severe stress scenario owing largely to its comfortable
CRAR position. However, the CRAR of some individual
NBFCs (accounting for around 5 per cent of total assets of
NBFC-ND-SIs), fell to below the regulatory requirement
of 15 per cent.
|