Sarat Dhal, Purnendu Kumar and Jugnu Ansari*
Economic growth and inflation are often used to characterize economic stability and
monetary or price stability. This study provides an empirical assessment of crucial issues
relating to the linkages of financial stability with economic growth and inflation in the Indian
context. For this purpose, the study uses vector auto-regression (VAR) model comprising
output, inflation, interest rates and a banking sector stability index. The banking stability
index is constructed with capital adequacy, asset quality, management efficiency, earnings and
liquidity (CAMEL) indicators. Our empirical investigation reveals that financial stability on the
one hand and macroeconomic indicators comprising output, inflation and interest rates on the
other hand can share a statistically significant bi-directional Granger block causal relationship.
The impulse response function of the VAR model provides some interesting perspectives. First,
financial stability, growth and inflation could share a medium-longer-term relationship. Second,
enhanced financial stability could be associated with higher growth accompanied by softer
interest rates and without much threat to price stability in the medium to long term. Third,
greater economic stability or higher output growth can enhance financial stability. Fourth,
higher inflation or price instability could adversely affect financial stability. Fifth, financial
stability can contribute to the effectiveness of monetary transmission mechanisms. Finally, with
financial stability, output growth could become more persistent and inflation less persistent.
JEL : E02, E52, G280, E310, O430, C320
Key words : Institutions and macroeconomy, financial stability, monetary transmission,
price stability, economic stability, financial regulation
Introduction
Should financial stability be pursued as a goal of policy? Can
financial stability goal be pursued along with conventional objectives of
policy such as economic stability and monetary stability, which are often
postulated in terms of economic growth and aggregate price inflation, respectively? Whether financial stability could be associated with
adverse or beneficial effects on growth and inflation conditions? Will
financial stability affect growth and inflation differentially over shorter
and medium-longer horizons? Whether financial stability can impinge
on the effectiveness of monetary transmission mechanism? Concerning
the period before the crisis, a key question is whether low monetary
policy rates have spurred risk-taking by banks. These policy issues have
witnessed intense deliberation by economists and authorities following
the series of economic crises since the late 1990s, including the Asian
Crisis and the more recent global crisis. While seeking answers to
these policy questions, a large literature has emerged with a variety of
perspectives on the subject. Low short-term interest rates make riskless
assets less attractive and may result in a search for yield, especially
by those financial institutions with short-term time horizons (Rajan
2005). Acute agency problems in banks, combined with a reliance on
short-term funding, may therefore lead low short-term interest rates—
more than low long-term interest rates—to spur risk-taking (Diamond
and Rajan 2006, 2012). It is generally agreed that financial stability,
unlike economic stability and monetary stability, cannot be defined
appropriately and uniquely. However, the lack of a common perspective
has not dissuaded economists to understand financial stability objective.
Drawing lessons from the distortions to real sectors across the countries
in terms of potential output loss and historic unemployment associated
with financial instability during the crisis periods, economists have
favoured practical considerations. Accordingly, financial stability goal
is pursued with strong, sound and stable institutions, competitive and
effective markets and efficient financial pricing perspectives. After
the global crisis, financial institutions are being subjected to stronger
regulatory framework in line with international standards such as the
Basel prudential norms pertaining to CAMEL indicators. Interestingly,
the Basel prudential norms since their inception in the late 1980s
have witnessed various concerns. Borio et.al. (2001) have expressed
concerns over bank indicators’ pro-cyclicality nature, i.e., the mutually
reinforcing feedback between the financial system and the real economy
that can amplify financial and business cycles. Many studies have
argued that the regulatory framework that existed prior to the global
financial crisis was deficient due to it being largely “microprudential” in nature, aimed at preventing the costly failure of individual financial
institutions (Crockett, 2000; Borio, et.al., 2001; Borio, 2003; Kashyap
and Stein, 2004; Kashyap, et.al., 2008; Brunnermeier et al., 2009; Bank
of England, 2009; French et al., 2010). In this context, it was suggested
that the regulatory framework should focus on ‘macroprudential’
approach to safeguard the financial system as a whole. Accordingly,
the IMF initiated the framework for Financial Soundness Indicators
comprising aggregated micro prudential indicators, financial market
indicators and macroeconomic indicators. In the aftermath of the crisis,
the new Basel III framework has embraced macro prudential approach
with emphasis on systemic risk and stability. The new regulatory
framework has fuelled an enormous debate. In many quarters it is argued
that a strengthening of regulatory framework in terms of higher capital,
liquidity and other requirements as envisaged under Basel III could
pose challenges for macroeconomic stability (Sinha et.al. 2011, Slovik,
Cournède, 2011, Locarno, 2011, BIS, 2010, IIF, 2011). In this context,
studies have recognised that macroeconomic challenges could differ
across developing and developed countries owing to their differences in
financial system and economic structure. Empirical studies, thus, have
proliferated with a focus on cross-country experiences and national
contexts in order to arrive at a generalised perspective on the subject.
In the Indian context, though financial stability has received
considerable attention from the authorities as evident from numerous
speeches of the central bank including Subbarao (2012, 2009), empirical
research on the subject with a focus on seeking answers to the above
questions is almost non-existent. Recently, Ghosh (2011) attempted at
constructing a simple index of banking fragility and identified the factors
affecting the index. Mishra et.al., (2013) provided an analysis of banking
stability as a precursor to financial stability. Both studies, however, did
not provide an analysis of dynamic interaction between macroeconomic
indicators and banking stability and fragility indicators. Thus, we are
motivated for undertaking a study in this direction. Moreover, we are
motivated with some applied perspectives. Firstly, from an operational
perspective, there is a considered view that financial system’s stability
can be attained by focusing on key institutions (Crocket, 2004). In the
Indian context, though financial system has witnessed a significant
diversification owing to reform, the banking sector continues to play a dominant role in three major areas: resource mobilisation
and allocation of such resources to productive sectors, payment and
settlement system, and key player in various financial market segments
such as money, credit, bond and foreign exchange markets. Therefore,
we focus on banking sector stability. Secondly, financial stability and
systemic risk can be postulated through multiple indicators comprising
soundness indicators of banks and financial institutions, indicators of
financial market prices and volatilities and macroeconomic indicators
(Sundarajan et.al., 2002). Illustratively, the soundness of banking
system envisaged under Basel principles, popularly known as CAMEL
approach recognises broadly five indicators: capital adequacy, asset
quality, management efficiency, earnings and liquidity. Studies show
that these indicators can be correlated with each other reflecting upon
banks’ behaviour and macroeconomic conditions. Thus, in line with
macro prudential regulation framework, central banks and numerous
research studies have engaged in constructing aggregated, synthetic
and composite indices for gauging stability of banking and financial
system as a whole (Cheang and Choy, 2010, Cardarelli, et.al. 2008,
Borio and Lowe, 2002, Van den End, 2006, Albulescu, 2010, Geršl and
Hermánek, 2006, BIS, 2001, Illing, and Liu, 2003 and 2006, Das et al.
2005, Misina and Tkacz, 2008, Balakrishnan, et.al. 2009). According to
Sundarajan (2002) and Das et.al. (2005), intuitively, a CAMEL index
aggregates quantitative and qualitative elements of the entire banking
sector and hence has a lot of appeal as a soundness indicator. We take
inspiration from these studies and construct the banking sector stability
index comprising CAMEL indicators for analysing the linkages among
financial stability, growth, inflation and interest rate. Thirdly, for the
empirical analysis, we follow the standard monetary transmission
mechanism literature and utilise the popular vector auto-regression
(VAR) methodology. In this context, we derive insights from Sims
(1992), Braun and Mittnik(1993), Dovern (2010), Kim et.al., (2011)
and Aikman et.al. (2009). These studies have not only highlighted
the inappropriateness of standard approach to monetary transmission
mechanism through a VAR model comprising three variables output,
prices and interest rate but also emphasised upon the usefulness of
an augmented VAR model taking into account banking and financial
stability indicators for meaningful policy analysis.
At the outset, our empirical analysis shows that financial stability
in terms of banking stability can share statistically significant bidirectional
Granger causal relationship with macroeconomic variables.
In terms of impulse response analyses of the VAR model, we found
that greater financial stability could be associated with higher economic
growth without much threat to price stability or inflation in the mediumlonger
horizon. Higher economic progress could lead to greater financial
stability. On the other hand, higher inflation or price instability could
adversely affect financial stability. Financial stability can help monetary
policy in terms of enhanced response of growth and inflation to interest
rate actions.. Also, financial stability can be associated with enhanced
output persistence and lower inflation persistence. In the following, the
paper is presented in five sections. Section II reviews the literature.
Section III discusses methodology and data followed by stylised facts in
Section IV, and empirical analysis in Section V. Section VI concludes.
Section II
Review of Literature
The copious literature on financial stability provides various
macroeconomic and micro foundation perspectives on the linkages
of the financial system and its stability with economic growth, price
stability and monetary policy. In the followings, we bring to the fore
some key perspectives that could justify our study.
II.1 Financial development and economic growth
The literature offers three major perspectives on the relationship
between financial sector development and economic growth. First,
there is the supply-leading theory, where financial development leads
to economic growth (e.g. Bagehot, 1873; King and Levine, 1993;
Schumpeter, 1911; McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973) . Bagehot (1873)
emphasized that the financial system played a critical role in promoting
industrialization in England by facilitating the mobilization of capital.
Three decades later, Schumpeter (1911) recognized Bagehot’s view
and pointed out that financial innovations are facilitated by financial
institutions very actively by identifying and funding productive
investments decisions for future growth. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) recognized the role of the financial sector in the mobilization of
saving and accentuation of capital accumulation, thereby, promoting
economic growth. Second, the demand-following response hypothesis
maintains that economic growth drives the development of the financial
sector. Robinson (1952) argued that financial sector development
follows economic growth. The third view maintains a simultaneous
causal relationship between financial development and economic
growth. Patrick (1966) found that the causal relationship between the
two was not static over the development process. When economic
growth occurs, the demand following response dominates the supply
leading response. But this sequential process was not generic across the
industries or the sectors.
Empirical studies also support the three hypotheses. As an example,
King and Levine (1993) showed a range of financial indicators robustly
and positively correlated with economic growth. Demirguc-Kunt and
Levine (1996) found a positive relationship between stock market,
market microstructure and the development of financial institutions.
Demetriades and Hussein (1996) found finance as a main factor in
the process of economic development. Odedokun (1996) showed
that financial intermediation supported economic growth in most of
the developing countries. Liu et.al. (2006) examined the relationship
between financial development and the source of growth for three
Asian economies, namely, Taiwan, Korea, and Japan. They found that
high investment rate accelerated economic growth in Japan, while it did
not lead to better growth performance in Taiwan and Korea, reflecting
upon allocation efficiency in the two countries. Ang (2008) in a study of
Malaysia showed that financial development led to higher output growth
by promoting both private saving and private investment. The study’s
empirical analysis supported the hypothesis that through improved
investment efficiency the growth could be achieved. Odhiambo (2008)
studied the dynamic causal relationship between financial depth and
economic growth in Kenya and found a distinct unidirectional causal
relationship between economic growth to financial development. The
study also concluded that any argument in which financial development
unambiguously leads to economic growth should be treated with
extreme caution.
II.2 Financial stability and economic growth
Until Kindleberger (1978), most studies on the role of the financial
sector in economic progress emphasized the degree of financial
development, usually, measured in terms of the size, depth, openness and
competitiveness of financial institutions. The stability and efficiency of
institutions did not receive much attention, possible due to the intuition
that the competitiveness and growth of financial institutions is due
to their efficiency in operations and resource allocation and optimal
risk management. Kindleberger (1978) and later Minsky (1991) put
forward a viewpoint about financial instability that indicated a negative
influence of financial sector on economic growth. Kindleberger
argued that the loss of confidence and trust in institutions could fuel
disintermediation and institutional closures, and when confidence falls,
investment probably falls too. According to Ang (2008), institutional
instability can also affect the organization of the financial sector and,
consequently, increase the cost of transactions and causes the problems
within the payments system. These transaction costs, which are real
resources leads to misallocation of the resources and hence the rate
of economic growth may suffer. Thus, a sound financial system
instils confidence among savers and investors so that resources can
be effectively mobilized to increase productivity in the economy.
According to Minsky’s (1991) “financial instability hypothesis”,
economic growth encourages the adoption of a riskier behaviour of the
financial institutions and speculative economic activities. Such an overleveraged
situation provides congenial conditions for a crisis caused by
firms default events on their loan repayments due to higher financial
costs. Consequently, higher financial costs and lower income can both
lead to higher delinquency rates and hence the economic recession.
Taking inspiration from Kindleberger (1978) and Minsky (1991),
Eichengreen and Arteta (2000) studied 75 emerging market economies
for the period 1975–1997. They showed that rapid domestic credit
growth was one of the key determinants of emerging market banking
crises. Similarly, Borio and Lowe (2002) using annual data for 34
countries from 1960 to 1999 showed that sustained and rapid credit
growth, combined with large increases in asset prices, increased the
probability of financial instability. Calderon et. al., (2004) on the other hand found that mature institutions and policy credibility allowed
some emerging market economies to implement stabilizing countercyclical
policies. These policies reduced business cycles and economic
fluctuations which led to more predictability power. This predictive
confidence provided a better investment environment that resulted in
more rapid growth.
II.3 Financial stability and inflation
The linkage of a financial system and its stability with inflation
conditions and monetary policy has been a very contentious issue in
the literature. Deliberation in this context entails two crucial issues: the
causal relationship between inflation and financial stability and whether
financial stability should be pursued as a goal of policy, especially by
inflation targeting central banks. Studies provide alternative perspectives
about the channels through which financial stability and inflation can
share a causal relationship (Bordo, 1998, Bordo et.al., 2001).
First, as derived from Fisher (1932 and 1933) and Schwartz (1995,
1997), there is a common perspective that inflation conditions can
interfere with the ability of the financial sector to allocate resources
effectively (Bordo et.al. 2001; Boyd, et.al. 2001; Issing, 2003; Huybens
and Smith, 1998, 1999). This is because inflation increases uncertainties
about future return possibilities. High inflation can be associated with
high inflation volatility and thus, the problem of predicting real returns
and, consequently, a rapid decline in banks’ lending activity to support
investment and economic activities. Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and
Bernanke, et. al. (1999) argued that business cycles could get aggravated
due to interaction between the price instability and frictions in credit
markets. An upward growth trajectory accompanied by high inflation
could cause over-investment and asset price bubbles. Sometimes, the
foundation for financial instability emanates from excessive credit
growth resulted due to realistic return expectations and not for real
investment (Boyd, Levine and Smith, 2001;Huybens and Smith, 1998,
1999). According to Cukierman (1992) banks cannot pass the policy
interest rate, an inflationary control measure of the central banks, as
quickly to their assets as to their liabilities which lead to increasing the
interest rate mismatch and, thus, market risk and financial instability.
Second, some studies emphasize that informational frictions
necessarily play a substantial role only when inflation exceeds certain
critical or threshold level (Azariadas and Smith, 1996, Boyd and Smith,
1998; Choi, et.al.,1996, Huybens and Smith, 1998, 1999; Rousseau,
2009 Rousseau and Wachtel 2002). According to these studies, credit
market frictions may be nonbinding under low inflation environment.
Therefore, low inflation may not distort the flow of information or
interfere with resource allocation and growth. However, beyond the
threshold level of inflation, credit market frictions become binding and
credit rationing intensifies and financial sector performance deteriorates.
When inflation exceeds a threshold, perfect foresight dynamics do not
allow an economy to converge to a steady state displaying either an
active financial system or a high level of real activity. According to Borio
(2006), financial imbalances can develop in a low inflation environment
owing to favourable supply side developments, productivity gains,
globalization and technological advances. In this context, the credibility
of price stability by anchoring inflationary expectations induces greater
stickiness in wages, can delay the inflationary pressures in the short
term but this may lead to unsustainable expansion of aggregate demand
in long run. The low inflation obviates the need of tighten monetary
policy and lead to the development of the imbalances.
II.4 Financial stability and monetary policy
The literature on the relationship of financial stability with
monetary policy and price stability is divided as to whether there are
synergies or a trade-off between them. Schwartz (1995) states that
price stability lead to low risk of interest rate mismatches and low
inflation risk premium. These minimisation of risks resulted from
the accurate prediction of the interest rate due to credibly maintained
prices. The proper risk pricing contribute to financial soundness.
From this perspective, price stability can serve as both necessary and
sufficient conditions for financial stability. Some authors, however, take
a cautious stance in this regard and argue that price stability can be
necessary but not a sufficient condition for achieving financial stability
(Issing, 2008; Padoa-Schioppa, 2002). Mishkin (1996) has argued that
a high interest rate measure to control inflation, could negatively affect
the balance sheets of both banks and firms. Herrero et.al., (2003) have argued that too lax a monetary policy can lead to inflation volatility.
Positive inflation surprises can redistribute real wealth from lenders to
borrowers and negative inflation surprises can have the opposite effect.
A very tight monetary policy may lead to disintermediation and hence
the financial instability. It is argued that a very low inflation levels
resulted from very tight monetary policy may lead to very low interest
rates that would make cash holdings more attractive than interestbearing
bank deposits and hence the disintermediation. Further, a sharp
increase in real interest rates have adverse effects on the balance sheets
of banks and may lead to credit crunch, with adverse consequences for
the financial and real sectors.
Driffill et.al., (2005) provided a theoretical argument that the
central banks interest rate smoothing process might induce a moral
hazard problem and promotes financial institutions to maintain riskier
portfolios. This phenomenon of interest rate smoothing sometimes lead
to indeterminacy of the economy’s rational expectations equilibrium
and inhibits active monetary policy. Thus smoothing may be both
unnecessary and undesirable.
Granville et.al., (2009) examined the relationship between financial
and monetary stability in EMU for a period 1994-2008 and found a long
term pro-cyclical relationship between the two. They suggested that
the interest rate instrument used for inflation targeting is conducive to
financial stability. Dovern et.al., (2010) used a VAR model with Uhlig’s
(2005) sign restrictions approach to understand the interaction between
the banking sector and the macro economy. Banking sectors stress
was captured alternatively through return on equity and loan writeoffs.
The authors found that the level of stress in the banking sector is
strongly affected by monetary policy shocks. Rotondi et. al., (2005)
found that the lagged interest rate influences the estimated policy rules
significantly which in turn promotes the financial stability. Goodfriend
(1987), Smith and Egteren (2004) argued that an aggressive monetary
policy induced macroeconomic stability might lead to riskier behaviour
of commercial banks and other financial institutions due to anticipated
implicit guarantees.
It is challenging task for central banks to maintain monetary and
financial stability simultaneously. The monetary stability in terms of low inflation could confound the imbalances that could lead to higher asset
price volatility which is having serious macroeconomic consequences
(Borio et.al., 2003; Borio and Lowe, 2002). Borio (2006) argued that
policymakers’ credibility in terms of the decisions to manage liquidity
that could result in an unsuccessful monetary policy in the one hand and
decreasing interest rates to increase liquidity could increase inflation on
the other hand. Poloz (2006) argued that successful inflation targeting
might lead to financial volatility and hence the central banks might
better focus on making financial systems more resilient than on trying
to develop more sophisticated policies aimed at reducing financial
volatility.
Kishan and Opiela (2000) argued that small and poorly capitalized
banks exhibit a significantly stronger loan contraction to monetary shocks
compared to large and well-capitalized banks. Kashyap and Stein (1995,
2000), pointed out the asymmetric effects of monetary transmission
under bank lending channel across banks size, capitalization and
liquidity. Monetary policy shocks have a very strong effect on banking
sector distress when the bank’s financial health is poor.
De Graeve, et.al. (2008) argued that an unexpected tightening
of monetary policy increases the probability of distress. The distress
responses have differential impact across the size, capitalization and
ownership of the banks. The authors found investigated that high
capital requirement is a necessary condition for ‘a’ resilient financial
system but not a sufficient condition. This finding supports the
regulators to think about extending the banking regulations beyond the
capital requirement. The nexus among price stability, financial stability
and monetary transmission highlights the crucial need for close coordination
between monetary and regulatory authority.
II.5 Macroeconomic impact of prudential indicators
While numerous studies have assessed the macroeconomic
implications of Basel’s prudential indicators, most have focussed on
capital and liquidity indicators. The Macroeconomic Assessment Group
(MAG, 2010a,b), of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(BCBS) estimated the transition costs of the new Basel III regulatory
standards in terms of loss in GDP growth and found a modest impact of
capital ratio on aggregate output growth. The Institute of International Finance (IIF) (2010) analyzed the impact of Basel III bank regulatory
requirements on the global economy and found that the aggregate level
of GDP in the United States, euro area and Japan and compared it with
a scenario without regulatory reform. Slovik and Cournede (2011)
studied the medium-term impact of Basel III requirements on aggregate
economic costs for the same economies by combining an accountingbased
framework and found an increase in lending spreads by 0.5 per
cent and cost 0.15 per cent decrease in GDP growth per annum.
Angelini et.al., (2011) endeavoured to assess the long-term
macroeconomic impact of new regulatory standards that is the Basel III
proposal relating to stronger capital and liquidity requirements. They
found that the every percentage point increase in capital and liquidity
requirements could be associated with the model’s decline in steady
state output relative to the baseline.
Gambacorta (2011), using a vector error correction model
(VECM), showed that higher capital and liquidity requirements could
lead to limited negative effects on long-run output and banks earnings.
As compared with the cost of banking crises the economic costs of
Basel III implementation is almost negligible (BCBS, 2010b). The
cost-benefit analysis performed by Locarno (2011), attempted for
a long run and short run assessment for the Italian economy with an
exclusive consideration of capital and liquidity requirements. The
analysis corroborated those of the MAG (2010a,b) and of the Long-
Term Economic Impact Group (BCBS, 2010a). Overall, the economic
impact of the new regulation is small. Eichberger and Summer (2005)
showed that the immediate impact of a capital adequacy constraint
of a bank could lead to decrease of loans to firms and increase in its
interbank position. Banks take higher risk in their lending activity by
granting loans with higher default probability and loss given default
(credit risk), but also by lengthening the loan maturity as in Diamond
and Rajan (2012), i.e., liquidity risk-taking.
Wong et.al., (2010) attempted using VECM a cost-benefit analysis
of higher regulatory capital requirement for Hong Kong and found that
the long-term benefits could be gained in terms of a lower probability of
banking crises while the costs could be associated with a lower output.
Taking a similar cost-benefit approach, Yun et.al., (2011) argued that stronger regulatory requirement could be associated with net long-term
output gains in the U.K .economy. In the similar approach Caggiano
and Calice (2011) assessed the impact of higher regulatory capital
requirements on aggregate output in a panel data model framework for
African economies and found net benefits of higher regulatory capital
requirements in terms of the resilient banking systems.
Section III
Methodology and data
We follow studies on policy transmission mechanism and use
the standard VAR model for our empirical analysis. We refrain from
rehashing the technical details of the VAR model because of its popularity.
For our purpose, we consider two VAR models with common lag-length
(q) a standard VAR model comprising three variables, output (y), price
(p) and interest rate (r) and an augmented VAR model involving the
financial stability indicator (F) as shown here:
VAR(q)s = [y,p,r]
VAR(q)F = [y,p,r,F]
A pertinent question then arises. Why should VAR(q)F be preferred
to VAR(q)s ? In this context we derive insights from numerous studies
(Braun and Mittnik,1993; Dovern et.al, 2010 and Sims, 1992) that have
shown that the standard VAR model comprising output, price and interest
rate may prove inappropriate for policy analysis owing to price puzzles,
forward looking expectations and policy makers processing a variety of
other important information including financial market developments
and the soundness of banks and financial institutions and supply shocks
in deciding the policy stance. From a statistical perspectives, Braun and
Mittnik(1993) showed that a lower dimensional VAR model such as the
VAR(q)s compared with a higher dimensional model VAR(q)F could suffer
from omitted variables bias and misspecification problems, resulting
in biased coefficients in the VAR model and inappropriate impulse
response and forecast error variance decomposition analyses. Dovern
et.al., (2010) cautioned that the VAR model with several variables runs
into the usual degrees-of-freedom problems that eventually haunt all
VAR studies. Therefore, the authors used a slightly augmented VAR
model with output, price, interest rate and one or two banking indicators.
Another issue is whether financial stability indicator should be taken as
an exogenous or endogenous variable in the VAR model. We resolve
the issue through Granger causality and block exogeneity analysis.
To implement the VAR model with a financial stability indicator,
we constructed an index of banking sectors stability comprising
CAMEL indicators pertaining to the ratio of capital to risk weighted
assets (CRAR), the ratio of gross non-performing loans (NPA) to total
loans and advances reflecting upon asset quality, managerial efficiency
defined in terms of operating expenses to total asset ratio (OEAR),
earnings and profitability measured by return on assets (ROA), and
liquidity ratio, that is, the proportion of liquid assets in total assets.
In this context, we derived insights from Mishra et.al. (2013), Das
et.al. (2005), Cheang and Choy (2009) and Maliszewski (2011)
and experimented with various ways of data mining to construct an
appropriate index using un-weighted (equivalent to equal weighted)
geometric mean and arithmetic mean indices as shown below.

where xj,t is the observed value of a CAMEL indicator j for the period
‘t’ and its sample period average, minimum, maximum and benchmark
values are xj,mean, xj,min, xj,max, and xj,o, respectively. For construction
of the Index FD, we set the benchmark value of xj,o, based on sample
statistics and applied perspectives. Accordingly, we used benchmark
value for capital adequacy ratio at 10 per cent in line with the regulatory requirement and the sample minimum values for other indicators i.e.,
NPA ratio at 2 per cent, operating expenses and provisions ratio at
3 per cent, return on assets at 0.9 per cent, and liquidity ratio 30 per
cent. Furthermore, it is to be noted that empirical CAMEL indicators
can have differential implications for financial stability. Illustratively,
higher CRAR could imply for risk aversion and lower leverage and
thus, improvement in financial stability. Similarly, higher return on
asset and liquidity ratio could be positively associated with financial
stability. However, an increase in the proportion of non-performing
loans in total loans could imply for deterioration of asset quality and
financial instability. Similarly, higher operating cost ratio could imply
for managerial inefficiency and financial instability. Therefore, we used
inverse of NPA and operating expense indicators for constructing their
indices, so that all CAMEL indicators could be linked with financial
stability in the same direction.
As regards data, we collected information from various sources
including the RBI, CMIE, NSE and individual bank websites. We had to
engage in data mining to create consistent series of CAMEL indicators
for a reasonably longer period. Illustratively, we could obtain data for
deriving CAMEL indicators for 39 banks comprising most public sector
banks and some of the old and new private sector banks for the period
1997:Q1 to 2012:Q3. We extended the series to begin from 1995:Q2
by using annual balance sheet data and extrapolation method*. It may
be mentioned that these 39 banks accounted for more than three-fourth
share of total banking sector (Table 2).
Table 2: Share of Sample Banks in the Banking Sector (excluding RRBs) |
(per cent) |
Capital and reserves |
78.6 |
Deposits |
90.1 |
Investment |
84.3 |
Gross loans and advances |
88.6 |
Total assets |
86.6 |
Gross NPAs |
92.0 |
Liquid assets |
86.2 |
Profit |
78.9 |
Section IV
Indian Banking System: Some Stylised Facts
India adopted reform in the early 1990s in the wake of balance of
payment crisis. The reform began with a focus on financial sector in
general and the banking system in particular, as the latter constituted the
principal component of financial system. As part of reform, the banking
sector was granted greater freedom in deposit mobilisation, allocation
of credit and pricing decisions. Competition in the banking system
was promoted by allowing new private sector banks and greater access
of foreign banks. The regulation and supervision system embraced
prudential regulation based on international standards such as Basel
principles. In order to support the banking sector operate effectively and
efficiently, financial markets were developed through newer instruments
and modern technology. Monetary policy framework shifted focus from
direct instruments such as reserve requirement to indirect instrument
such as interest rate and liquidity adjustment facility.
The reform led banking system showed significant improvement
in terms of soundness, operational and allocation efficiency parameters
(Table 3). Illustratively, during 1995-96, the capital adequacy ratio
(CRAR) for the entire banking system stood at 8.7 per cent with 75
banks showing capital adequacy ratio (CRAR) above the regulatory
requirement of 8 per cent and 17 banks showing CRAR below 8 per
cent. In the wake of the Asian crisis, the regulatory capital adequacy
requirement was increased to 9 per cent by March 1998. Since then
banks have shown sustained improvement in meeting the capital
requirement above the stipulated minimum. During 2007-08, the CRAR
for the banking system stood at 13 per cent, 400 basis points higher than
the minimum regulatory requirement. Similarly, asset quality showed
steady improvement as the ratio of gross non-performing loans to gross
advances ratio declined from as high as 17 per cent in 1995-96 to 2.4 per
cent during 2007-08. Managerial efficiency improved with operating
expenses to total assets ratio declining by one percentage point between
1995-96 and 2007-08. The liquidity ratio showed a moderation of 10
percentage points reflecting the impact of SLR reduction to enable
banks for providing increased credit to private sector to support growth, which is reflected in rising trend in credit-deposit ratio (CDR). The
profitability indicator, which showed a volatile trend during the 1990s,
exhibited stability as the return on asset ratio hovered around 1 per
cent during 2002-03 to 2007-08. After the global crisis, bank indicators
have shown some weaknesses especially during the last two years.
There has been moderation in capital adequacy indicator, increase in
NPA ratio, and rising operating expenses reflecting upon the impact of
macroeconomic conditions.
Table 3: CAMEL indicators of the Indian banking sector (%)* |
Year |
CRAR |
GNPAR |
OEAR |
ROA |
LQDR |
CDR |
Growth |
Inflation |
1996 |
8.70 |
17.40 |
2.94 |
0.15 |
|
55.16 |
7.3 |
8.0 |
1997 |
10.40 |
15.70 |
2.85 |
0.66 |
41.24 |
51.26 |
8.0 |
4.6 |
1998 |
11.50 |
14.40 |
2.63 |
0.81 |
41.89 |
50.39 |
4.3 |
4.4 |
1999 |
11.30 |
14.70 |
2.65 |
0.49 |
41.88 |
47.95 |
6.7 |
5.9 |
2000 |
11.10 |
12.70 |
2.48 |
0.66 |
42.25 |
49.26 |
7.6 |
3.3 |
2001 |
11.40 |
11.40 |
2.64 |
0.50 |
42.70 |
49.82 |
4.3 |
7.2 |
2002 |
12.00 |
10.40 |
2.19 |
0.75 |
41.77 |
53.69 |
5.5 |
3.6 |
2003 |
12.70 |
8.80 |
2.24 |
1.00 |
41.60 |
54.53 |
4.0 |
3.4 |
2004 |
12.90 |
7.20 |
2.20 |
1.13 |
42.68 |
54.82 |
8.1 |
5.5 |
2005 |
12.80 |
5.20 |
2.13 |
0.89 |
39.17 |
62.63 |
7.0 |
6.5 |
2006 |
12.30 |
3.48 |
2.13 |
0.88 |
34.46 |
70.07 |
9.5 |
4.4 |
2007 |
12.40 |
2.64 |
1.92 |
0.90 |
32.34 |
73.46 |
9.6 |
6.6 |
2008 |
13.00 |
2.39 |
1.79 |
0.99 |
32.46 |
74.61 |
9.3 |
4.7 |
2009 |
13.20 |
2.45 |
1.71 |
1.01 |
32.55 |
73.83 |
6.7 |
8.1 |
2010 |
13.58 |
2.51 |
1.66 |
0.95 |
32.42 |
73.66 |
8.6 |
3.8 |
2011 |
13.02 |
2.36 |
1.71 |
0.98 |
29.85 |
76.52 |
9.3 |
9.6 |
2012 |
12.94 |
2.94 |
1.65 |
0.98 |
28.94 |
78.63 |
6.2 |
8.9 |
2013 (Sep12) |
12.54 |
3.59 |
1.84 |
1.02 |
30.04 |
74.3 |
5.0 |
|
Note: * Excluding RRBs.
The term CRAR stands for the ratio of capital to risk weighted assets ratio; GNPAR is the ratio
of gross non-performing loans and advances to gross loans and advances; OEAR is the ratio
of operating expenses to total assets ratio; ROA is return on assets (ratio of net profit to total
assets); LQDR is the ratio of liquid assets to total assets and CDR is credit-deposit ratio.
Source: RBI Publications: Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy; Statistical Tables
Relating to Banks in India; Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India. |
Section V
Empirical findings
As common to time series analysis, our empirical analysis begins
with unit root test of economic and financial variables including output,
prices, interest rate and banking sector’s CAMEL indicators and the
financial stability index as shown in Table 4. We find that during the
sample period, the output indicator, real GDP (excluding agriculture
and public administration) in levels after seasonal adjustment and log
transformation, turned out to be non-stationary but stationary process
in terms of first difference and year-on-year growth. Similarly, the
wholesale price index turned non-stationary in level form but stationary
in first difference form. The call money interest rate can be stationary in
level form. Among banking indicators, three of the CAMEL indicators
pertaining to capital adequacy, asset quality and managerial efficiency
were found to be non-stationary variables in levels but stationary
processes in their first differences. On the other hand, return on assets and
liquidity ratio indicators could be stationary in levels. Thus, the index
of financial stability, after seasonal adjustment and log transformation,
turned out to be non-stationary in level but stationary in first difference.
Table 4: Unit root test |
|
Levels |
First Differences |
ADF Statistic |
Probability |
ADF Statistic |
Probability |
CRAR |
-2.30 |
0.43 |
-8.77 |
0.00 |
GNPAR |
-0.94 |
0.94 |
-4.79 |
0.00 |
OEAR |
-2.31 |
0.42 |
-5.82 |
0.00 |
ROA |
-3.31 |
0.02 |
|
|
LQDR |
-3.29 |
0.03 |
|
|
FA |
-1.84 |
0.67 |
-5.04 |
0.00 |
FB |
-1.84 |
0.67 |
-5.04 |
0.00 |
FC |
-1.84 |
0.67 |
-5.04 |
0.00 |
FD |
-1.84 |
0.67 |
-5.04 |
0.00 |
FS |
-1.12 |
0.92 |
-10.80 |
0.00 |
LY |
-1.16 |
0.91 |
-7.74 |
0.00 |
LP |
0.82 |
1.00 |
-5.70 |
0.00 |
r |
-9.30 |
0.00 |
|
|
Deriving from the unit root analysis, we estimated VAR models
comprising alternative combinations of stationary variables in first
differences. Following the arguments of Dhal (2012), we also include
in the VAR models two exogenous variables pertaining to oil price
shock (first difference of log transformed mineral oil price index) and
food price inflation (first difference of seasonally adjusted and log
transformed food price index) in order to account for the supply shocks.
Table 5 provides summary statistics of these VAR models. Alluding to
our discussion earlier, the VAR models with banking stability index
based on various sample statistics show similar system properties. Thus,
we considered two alternative indicators of stability: the calibrated index
(FD), geometric mean index and the standardised index (FS), arithmetic
mean index. The summary statistics of the VAR models validate the
model with financial stability as compared with the model without
this indicator. Illustratively, consider the two VAR models; VAR1
comprising three variables, namely, the first differences of seasonally
adjusted and log transformed real GDP (dY) and Price Index (dP) and
call money rate (r) and VAR 2 which additionally included the first
difference of seasonally adjusted and log transformed financial stability indicator (dF). The model with financial stability indicator (VAR2), as
compared with the model without financial stability (VAR1), could be
validated in terms of predictive power as reflected in higher value of
log-likelyhood, lower value of the determinant of residual covariance
matrix and better i.e. lower value of information criteria. Thus, for
further analysis we confine our discussion to VAR models based on
banking stability index, FD and FS.
Table 5: Summary Statistics of VAR Models |
|
Model statistics |
VAR Models |
Determinant residual covariance (degrees of freedom adjusted) |
Determinant residual covariance |
Log likelihood |
Akaike information criterion |
Schwarz criterion |
VAR1:
[dy,dp,r] |
1.99E-09 |
7.51E-10 |
406.14 |
-10.84 |
-9.03 |
VAR2:
[dy,dp,r,dFA] |
2.64E-12 |
5.06E-13 |
551.24 |
-14.25 |
-11.31 |
VAR2:
[dy,dp,r,dFB] |
2.64E-12 |
5.05E-13 |
551.26 |
-14.25 |
-11.31 |
VAR2:
[dy,dp,r,dFC] |
2.64E-12 |
5.06E-13 |
551.25 |
-14.25 |
-11.31 |
VAR2:
[dy,dp,r,dFD] |
2.64E-12 |
5.05E-13 |
551.26 |
-14.25 |
-11.31 |
VAR2:
[dy,dp,r,dFS] |
1.02E-11 |
1.96E-12 |
507.25 |
-12.90 |
-9.96 |
Note: output, price and banking stability indices are first difference of seasonally adjusted log transformed series. |
Taking the analysis further, Table 6 provides results for Granger
non-causality block exogeneity test for two VAR models with financial
stability indicator. Results show that financial stability can share
statistically significant bi-directional Granger causal relationship with
macroeconomic variables including output, price and interest rate taken
together. Thus, financial stability can be considered as an endogenous
variable in the VAR model. As regards other variables, output and
interest rate shared significant bi-directional Granger causal relationship
with other variables. The price variable Granger caused other variables.
It was also Granger caused by other variables, albeit, at higher level of
significance at 10 per cent.
Table 6: Granger non-causality block exogeneity test |
|
Model:
[dY, dP, r, dFD] |
Model:
[dY, dP, r, dFS] |
Granger Causal Relationship |
Chi-square (dof) / [probability] |
Chi-square (dof) / [probability] |
Output growth (dY) does not Granger cause others |
20.10 |
21.45 |
[0.065] |
[0.044] |
Other variables do not cause output (dY) |
34.75 |
34.50 |
[0.001] |
[0.001] |
Inflation (dP) does not Granger causes others |
28.50 |
19.57 |
[0.005] |
[0.076] |
Other variables do not cause inflation (dP) |
25.44 |
22.67 |
[0.013] |
[0.031] |
Interest rate (r) does not Granger causes others |
50.24 |
41.04 |
[0.000] |
[0.000] |
Other variables do not cause interest rate (r) |
31.69 |
32.29 |
[0.002] |
[0.001] |
Financial stability (dF) does not Granger cause others |
32.53 |
30.03 |
[0.001] |
[0.003] |
Other variables do not cause financial stability (dF) |
34.72 |
27.53 |
[0.001] |
[0.006] |
V.1 Impulse response analysis
In a VAR model, impulse responses can vary according to the
order of the variables appearing in the model. Thus, we considered
two types of impulse responses: Choleski decomposition procedure
and generalised impulse responses owing to Peasaran and Shin (1997).
Interestingly, both types of impulse responses appeared to be more
or less similar. Thus, we focus on the Choleski impulse responses of
the VAR model with output, price, interest rate and financial stability
indicator appearing in that order. Since our objective is to assess total
impact of a variable on other variables over shorter and medium-longer
horizons, we considered accumulated responses. The impulse responses
of variables along with asymptotic standard error bands arising from
the VAR model with financial stability indicator are shown in Annex
1 and 2. The impulse response analysis provides answers to some of
the critical issues we raised in the beginning. In this regard, we cull out
the impulse responses (suppressing the associated standard error) as
provided in the Annex for the following discussion.
V.1.1 Impact of financial stability on the macro indicators
We first consider the impact of financial stability on macro
indicators, viz., output growth, inflation and interest rates. From the model
estimated with first differences of output (dY), prices (dP), financial
stability (dF) and interest rate (r) in level, we found that a positive one
standard deviation shock to financial stability could be associated with
positive responses of both output and price variables accompanied by
softer interest rate (Chart 1). It was evident that financial stability could have significant impact on growth over the medium term between 8 to
24 quarters as the impact beyond 24 quarters could not be statistically
significant due to large standard errors. Moreover, financial stability
impact on output growth at about 1.2 per cent at 24-quarters horizon
was substantially higher than the inflation impact at 0.25 per cent. This
implies that financial stability could promote economic growth without
much threat to price stability over medium-longer horizon.

V.1.2 Impact of macroeconomic conditions on financial stability
Second, a positive standard deviation shock to output growth,
implying greater economic stability could be associated with enhanced
financial stability (see Table 7). However, a positive standard deviation
shock to the inflation rate implying price instability could adversely
affect financial stability. In absolute terms, both inflation and growth
shocks had more or less similar impact on financial stability over
the medium to long term horizon. Thus, economic stability and price
stability could promote financial stability.
Table 7: Impulse response of financial stability to macroeconomic shocks(%) |
Period |
Output Impact |
Price Impact |
Interest rate Impact |
1 |
0.62 |
-1.32 |
0.14 |
|
(1.13) |
(1.13) |
(1.12) |
4 |
6.09 |
-4.48 |
1.46 |
|
(2.19) |
(1.77) |
(1.76) |
8 |
5.67 |
-5.30 |
-0.09 |
|
(3.10) |
(2.66) |
(2.40) |
12 |
6.29 |
-5.84 |
-1.04 |
|
(4.04) |
(3.12) |
(3.12) |
20 |
6.95 |
-6.59 |
-1.87 |
|
(5.47) |
(4.15) |
(4.43) |
40 |
7.31 |
-7.02 |
-2.38 |
|
(6.80) |
(5.25) |
(5.83) |
60 |
7.35 |
-7.06 |
-2.43 |
|
(7.02) |
(5.44) |
(6.07) |
Figures in parentheses indicate asymptotic standard errors. |
V.1.3 Effectiveness of monetary transmission: Role of financial stability
Thirdly, a positive standard deviation shock to interest rate,
reflecting upon tight monetary policy stance, can contain inflation but
adversely affect growth and financial stability. However, in terms of size, its impact on financial stability could be much lower than growth
and inflation effects. A comparative picture of the output and inflation
responses to call money rate shock arising from the model without
financial stability (VAR1) and the model with financial stability (VAR2)
provides insights about the role of financial stability in influencing the
effectiveness of monetary policy (see Chart 2). In this case, we find that
financial stability does not affect effectiveness of monetary transmission
mechanism in the shorter horizon. However, in medium and longer
horizons, output and inflation responses to monetary policy stance
could be a sizably enhanced due to financial stability. This is evident
from output and inflation responses to the call money rate shock arising
from the model with financial stability being 30 to 40 per cent higher
than the model without financial stability. Thus, financial stability can
contribute to medium-longer term effectiveness of monetary policy in
macroeconomic stabilisation.

V.1.4 Persistence of Growth and Inflation: Role of Financial Stability
Fourthly, a comparison between the two VAR models with and
without financial stability indicator also shows the changes in the nature
of output and inflation persistence to their own shocks (see Chart 3).
With the presence of financial stability indicator, output shock could
be more persistent and inflation less persistent over medium and longer
horizon. From a comparative perspective between output and inflation,
the increase in persistence of output is much higher than the moderation
of persistence in inflation owing to financial stability. Following Cochrane (1988) and Campbell and Mankiew (1987), persistence in
economic time series can reflect on the importance of their permanent
component relative to transitory component. Accordingly, the role of
financial stability in influencing output and inflation persistence can be
interpreted.
V.1.5 Interest rate’s response to growth and inflation: Role of financial
stability
The impulse response analysis provides insights about how interest
rate would react to growth and inflation shocks with and without
the presence of financial stability in the VAR model (see Chart 4).

Illustratively, in the model without financial stability (VAR1), interest
rate reacts positively to positive shocks to both output and inflation
indicators, though the interest rate’s response to price shocks is
substantially higher than its response to output shock. This finding could
be attributed to greater sensitiveness of policy rate to price stability
than economic growth. However, in the presence of financial stability,
i.e., VAR2 model, interest rate continues to react positively to inflation
shock and such reaction is enhanced in the medium term. On the other
hand, in response to output shock, interest rate reacts positively, albeit
marginally, in the short run but negatively and substantially in the
medium-longer horizon as compared with its short run response. This
implies that financial stability could facilitate softer policy to promote
growth and tighter policy to achieve price stability in the mediumlonger
horizon.
Section VI
Conclusion
In this study, we endeavoured at providing applied perspectives
on some crucial policy issues relating to the relationship of financial
stability with growth and inflation which characterise economic stability
and monetary stability objectives. We experimented with aggregate
banking sector soundness index comprising prudential CAMEL
indicators based on quarterly data for a sample of 39 banks comprising
all public sector banks and major old and new private sector banks.
We used an augmented VAR model for analysing the transmission
mechanism. Our empirical investigation brought to the fore some
interesting perspectives. First, financial stability, growth and inflation
could share a medium to longer term relationship, and this finding is
in line with several studies. Second, financial stability can promote
growth without posing much threat to price stability. Third, financial
stability can enhance the effectiveness of monetary transmission
mechanism. Fourth, economic growth can have positive influence on
financial stability. But inflation can adversely affect financial stability.
Finally, with financial stability, growth could be more persistent and
inflation less persistent. Since persistence could imply for permanent
component, we can infer that financial stability will be beneficial for
growth and price stability. Thus, we conclude that financial stability
goal can be pursued along with conventional objectives in the Indian
context.
These findings are expected to be useful for policy purposes.
Going forward, research on the subject could be extended inter alia
through two major directions. First, attempts can be made towards
constructing a quarterly index of financial stability index comprising
CAMEL indicators and financial market indicators for reasonably
longer period to examine further perspectives on the subject. Second,
on the methodological front, VAR models with Bayesian analysis and
sign restrictions on impulse response and structural identification could
be useful. In addition, attempts can be made to use the VECM to explore
long-run relationship between financial stability and macroeconomic
indicators.
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