Thank you for inviting me to this forum once again
and that too in these sublime environs. Only in such
sublimity could the deeply spiritual concept of ‘Gross
National Happiness’ have been crystallised into a
national policy mission. The theory of Gross National
Happiness (GNH) established by His Majesty the King
of Bhutan in 1972, defines Bhutan’s development
objective as improvement in the happiness and
satisfaction of the people rather than growth of Gross
National Product (GNP). Included in GNH is a ‘middle
path’ approach in which spiritual and material pursuits
are balanced. I can only hope that after a deep, longstanding
relationship with Bhutan over the last several
years, we are able to incorporate at least the spirit of
this approach in our economic policies.
2. I have been a inaugural speaker at the FEDAI
conferences during past few years, in person or in
absentia and it is always a challenge to select an
appropriate topic in line with the overall theme of the
conference. I felt really relieved that the theme for this
Conference attempts to capture a broader canvas,
revolving around long-run growth cycles. I hope the
deliberations enable us to focus more closely on the
relationship between the cart and the horse so that
foreign exchange flows do support growth.
3. There are several ways in which capital flows and
growth are related. First, growth expectations drive
capital flows. In turn, capital flows accelerate growth.
If capital flows are well-absorbed by the real economy
and do not generate macro-economic or financial
instabilities, they stay. Such capital flows augment
growth over the long-run and may help income levels
in developing economies converge towards the income
levels in advanced economies. Second, capital is likely
to be attracted towards countries with high productivity
growth and higher marginal productivity of capital.
However, in practice this is found to be not necessarily true. Third, what is generally missed is the fact that it
is not just the net capital flows that drive growth, but
also the gross capital flows contribute to growth. Gross
capital flows contribute immensely to diffusion of
technology and international knowledge flows. Fourth,
growth augmentation can also take place because
capital flows enforce macro-economic discipline and
force firms to improve governance. However, the
impact of capital flows on growth ultimately depends
on their being stable and less volatile. Durable capital
flows bring durable growth, while non-durable and
volatile capital flows not only bring about non-durable
growth but also large output losses in cases of currency
or banking crisis. This, however, does not make a case
for capital controls as, in a globalised world, capital
account liberalisation is seen as a plus-sum game.
4. According to IMF’s World Economic Outlook
(October 2010), private financial flows to Emerging
Markets Economies (EMEs) are projected to increase
to USD 339.6 billion in 2010 as compared to USD 234.8
billion in 2009, accounted for mainly by equity flows.
Growth in bank lending, after the rebound since the
crisis lows, is expected to slow down. Going further,
however, the improved growth scenario in developed
markets (DM) and the rising concerns regarding
inflation in the EMEs has created uncertainty in regard
to the quantum of flows to EMEs. Global imbalances,
which have been the driver of capital flows over the
past several years, are expected to continue.
5. Given the inherent uncertainties, most of the
capital recipient EMEs are going to find it challenging
to respond dynamically. If the tide of global flows
changes, it may not be easy to change policy gears
swiftly though the magnitude of impact would depend
on the specific macroeconomic situation, particularly
the current account position. Over a longer horizon,
therefore, it makes sense to have a broad
framework for capital account management from a
macroprudential perspective.
6. It is this post-crisis shift in regard to the approach
to capital account that I intend to talk about today.
Beyond the immediate impact of capital flows on
exchange rate dynamics, the procyclicality of such flows
and implications for financial stability are being clearly
recognised. In this context, the underlying theme that
I want to bring out is that irrespective of the stage of
liberalisation of capital account, there seems to be an
imperative need for a framework for capital account
management which gives the policymakers sufficient
space and instruments to be able to modulate policy
to the different characteristics of capital flows. Not
having such a framework only enhances the disruptive
impact of sudden capital control measures when they
are announced.
Shift in the Approach to Capital
Account Management
7. The recent crisis has clearly been a turning point
in the world view on capital controls. The issue of
regulation of capital flows has slowly but steadily
moved to the centrestage, from earlier being confined
to the periphery of the mainstream policy discourse.
The hesitancy of policymakers at the helm in discussing
this openly earlier has given way to a welcome
openness.
8. Even the Bretton Woods institutions have
revisited their earlier approach on the issue of
management of capital flows. There was a time in the
nineties that, backed by the intellectual force of the
‘Washington Consensus’, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) at one point was considering including
liberalisation of international capital movements as a
central purpose of the Fund. The subsequent crisis in
East Asia in 1997, however, halted such moves of the
IMF.
9. It seems to have come full circle now. The
experience of many EMEs during the crisis underlined
the financial stability implications of volatile capital
flows. At the G-20 Seoul Summit in November 2010,
the Leaders agreed ‘to work on financial stability issues
that are of particular interest to emerging market and
developing economies and called on the Financial
Stability Board (FSB), IMF and World Bank to develop
and report before the next Summit. These issues include the management of foreign exchange risks by
financial institutions corporations and households....’
10. A recent policy note prepared by the IMF Staff2 puts the issue of cross-border capital flows in
perspective. It recognises the destabilising impact of
capital floods and droughts particularly on emerging
economies, noting that volatile capital flows played a
key role in the recent crisis, both in increasing
vulnerabilities and in transmitting shocks across
borders. Recently, a group of more than 250 economists
have written an open letter to the US Government,
explaining the benign influences of capital controls and
stressing the need for the US to dilute the capital
control covenants in the US trade and investment
treaties. Increasingly, many EMEs are beginning to
impose capital controls and regulations, both of the
traditional kind such as reserve requirements,
unremunerated reserve requirement (URR) and
restrictions on investment in debt including minimum
investment period but also more innovative ones such
as prudential measures, administrative measures, tax
measures and quantitative limits, particularly targeting
the derivative positions held by banks. Indeed, many
of these derivatives were initially invented to avoid
precisely regulations on capital inflows or other types
of financial activity.
11. The key elements of this shift have been the
following :
-
Ex ante management of capital flows is now
accepted as a legitimate instrument of
macroeconomic policy and financial stability.
Though exchange rate appreciation is still
considered the preferred ex post policy option in
dealing with inflows, intervention is now justified
if there is major veering away of the currency from
its fundamental value.
-
The limitations of individual country-specific
measures are being articulated. The IMF policy
note seeks to address the issue through
development of rules of the game for global capital
flows and in fostering multilateral, nondiscriminatory,
approaches that look to the
interest of both the originators and recipients of capital. Is such a framework possible? I am not
sure but till then countries impacted by this would
need to continue to find their answers.
-
It is increasingly being recognised that it is gross
flows that determine risk exposures and are,
therefore, important for financial stability. Netting
of cross-temporal flows does not capture the real
impact of gross capital flows on exchange rate as
well as asset price impacts.
-
Capital control measures are being designed more
innovatively for effectiveness. Derivative
transactions are increasingly being specifically
targeted and many countries are resorting to
enhanced supervision and data reporting to
monitor the build-up of currency positions in the
books of banks.
-
The issue of capital flows is getting factored in
the macroprudential framework being envisaged
for financial institutions globally. Procyclicality of
capital flows and of wholesale market funding can
engender vulnerabilities. Prudential measures to
address asset market volatility such as risk
weights, provisioning, Loan to Value (LTV) ratios,
margin requirements and the build-up of foreign
currency liabilities in the financial system are also
considered as legitimate instruments to respond
to destabilising capital flows.
-
There is greater recognition of the insurance
needs of countries. While it was commonly argued
before the crisis that many Asian countries were
incurring avoidable costs in accumulating large
foreign currency reserves, it has been widely
noted that countries with large reserves fared
relatively well during the crisis. Forex reserves
have provided self-insurance during the global
liquidity crisis. Those countries that built-up
precautionary reserve holding were able to avoid
large depreciation in the ‘Panic of 2008’.3
-
The argument for compositional irrelevance of
capital flows stands questioned. A recent IMF
paper4 has concluded that the appreciation effect of private flows differs by type of flow. Portfolio
investments, which are more volatile, have the
highest appreciation effect, followed by FDI and
bank loans. Since these flows are potentially
related to an increase in productive capacity, the
real appreciation associated with FDI and bank
loans is barely one-seventh of the real appreciation
due to portfolio investments. Private transfers
(mainly remittances) are the flows that have the
least appreciation effect. This may suggest that
remittances are not procyclical.
12. The cross-country experience of controls on
inflows and outflows provides some conjectures for
policy purposes. These are summarised below :
-
It is evident that while the controls on capital
inflows have proved somewhat effective in
containing pressures on foreign exchange
markets, the experiments with controls on
outflows by the EMEs, particularly in crisis
situations did not help in alleviating the exchange
market pressures.
-
While controls to limit short-term inflows could
be helpful in specific circumstances, such
restrictions in force for longer term entail costs.
However, temporary uses of controls are more
effective and can even improve the financial
environment.
-
It is important to recognise that neither the use
of capital controls is uniform nor the results are
identical. In addition, their impact can be subdued
by global conditions.
-
In case of pressures arising out of capital outflows,
the controls in the form of numerous restrictions
on the banks’ external transactions were not fully
effective as they were circumvented in many
instances.
-
Moreover, the various instruments of controls
provided only temporary relief or contained the
initial pressures on forex markets when there
were internal or external imbalances (i.e., high
fiscal deficit, weaknesses in the financial sector,
high current account deficit).
-
Off-shore markets for the domestic currency (e.g.,
NDF markets) proved to be an important source of speculation and, in some instances, control
measures could not succeed.
-
In case of crises countries, the instruments
deployed to control outflows were ultimately
replaced by the abandonment of exchange rate
band/peg in favour of float.
Indian Context
13. The policy approach in India to the issue of capital
flows has evolved from the broader objective of
maintaining financial and macroeconomic stability and
not merely addressing the singular variable of exchange
rate. The salient elements of this framework have been:
i. an explicitly stated active capital account
management framework, based on the policy
stance of encouraging non-debt creating and longterm
capital inflows and discouraging debt flows;
ii. having the policy space to use multiple
instruments – quantitative limits, price-based
measures as well as administrative measures,
particularly for foreign currency borrowing by
corporates ;
iii. short-term debt permitted only for trade
transaction;
iv. avoiding the ‘original sin’ of excessive foreign
currency borrowings by domestic entities,
particularly the sovereign;
v. prudential regulations to prevent excessive
dollarisation of balance sheets of financial sector
intermediaries, particularly banks;
vi. cautious approach to liability dollarisation by
domestic entities; and
vii. significant liberalisation of permissible avenues
for outward investments for domestic entities.
Recent trends
14. During the past five years, like other EMEs, India
has been experiencing consistently strong capital flows,
barring the crisis year of 2008-09. During the crisis year
of 2008-09, net capital flows plummeted to USD 6.8
billion (0.5 per cent of GDP) from USD 106.6 billion
(8.7 per cent of GDP) in 2007-08. The net capital flows
again surged to USD 53.6 billion (4.1 per cent of GDP)
during 2009-10. During the first half of 2010-11 (April- September 2010), the net capital flows were USD 36.7
billion, which was 59.6 per cent higher than the net
flows during the same period of the previous year (USD
23.0 billion).
Table 1 : Volatility of Capital |
(USD Billion) |
Items |
2006-07 |
2007-08 |
2008-09 |
2009-10 |
2010-11
(April-Sept.) |
FDI (net) |
22.8 |
34.7 |
37.07 |
33.1 |
12.6 |
FIIs (net) |
3.2 |
20.3 |
-15.0 |
29.1 |
22.3 |
ECB (net) |
16.4 |
22.6 |
6.7 |
3.3 |
6.3 |
Trade Credit (net) |
6.6 |
15.9 |
-1.9 |
7.6 |
6.8 |
Banking Capital (net) |
1.9 |
11.8 |
-3.2 |
2.1 |
0.8 |
NRI Deposits (net) |
4.3 |
0.3 |
4.3 |
2.9 |
2.2 |
15. The latest trends in capital flows indicate that
the net capital flows during 2010-11 are expected to
be higher than in 2009-10. FII investment, ECBs and
trade credit dominate capital flows with FII flows
remaining as the major driver of capital flows during
the current year so far. During the period up to
February 4, 2011 the net FIIs flows stood at USD 29.6
billion as against USD 22.4 billion during the
corresponding period of 2009-10. The ECBs registered
during April-December 2010 amounted to USD 15.8
billion as against USD 13.8 billion during April-
December 2009.
16. FCCBs have constituted a significant part of the
ECBs raised during the last few years, except for the
sudden decline in the immediate aftermath of the
crisis.
17. However, with focus on capital flows on a net
basis, it is often not realised that portfolio flows were
USD 174 billion a year over last three years on a gross
basis, far outstripping FDI flows at USD 37 billion a
year. In gross terms, over the last five years (2005-06 to 2009-10) FII flows have accounted for 47 per cent of
the gross capital inflows to India as against 9 per cent
for FDI inflows. This, of course, has more to do with
the nature of these flows with a much larger churn for
portfolio capital. High gross flows make an economy
more susceptible to such reversals and, as such, we
need to continue to maintain adequate buffers.
Table 2 : Issuance of FCCBs |
(USD Million) |
Year |
Total FCCBs |
Total ECB |
Share of FCCB to total ECBs
(in per cent) |
2004-05 |
470 |
11,490 |
8 |
2005-06 |
2402 |
17,175 |
28 |
2006-07 |
5,736 |
25,352 |
20 |
2007-08 |
5,854 |
30,959 |
20 |
2008-09 |
27 |
18,362 |
1 |
2009-10 |
3,274 |
21,678 |
15 |
2010-11* |
1,265 |
15,994 |
8 |
* upto December 2010. |
18. In the current context, a high current account
deficit (CAD) has been absorbing much of the capital
flows in aggregate terms. The concerns, however, arise
on account of the composition of flows coupled with
lower order of reserves accretion and faster increase
in external liabilities.
19. The enhanced exposure to external liabilities is
reflected in the sharp increase in the ratio of external
debt to foreign exchange reserves from 89.1 per cent
of GDP in 2008-09 to 99.1 per cent as at end-June 2010.
Moreover, the ratio of short-term debt to reserves has
increased from 17.2 per cent to 21.0 per cent during
the same period. Another issue that may come up going
forward relates to repayment of FCCBs. The
redemption pressures on account of FCCBs would start
building up from 2010-11 and peak in the next couple
of years till 2012-13.
20. The relaxation of buy-back guidelines and
refinancing has helped the corporates to better plan
for the impending repayments. The lessons of the crisis
will hopefully lead to better management and
accounting of such liabilities by the corporates.
21. As is evident from the accretion to reserves and
given the current account deficit, unlike other central
banks from emerging markets, the Reserve Bank has
been the least interventionist. India’s foreign exchange reserves (excluding valuation effects) increased by USD
7.0 billion during the first half of 2010-11. Foreign
exchange reserves as on January 14, 2011 stood at USD
297.4 billion. Though it is recognised that foreign
exchange reserves can only be partial antidote to capital
flow volatilities, they indeed work as comfort buffers
during times of crisis.
Table 3 : FCCBs redemption profile (as on December 31, 2010) |
Year |
FCCBs due for redemption
(USD million) |
2010-11 |
1,169.24 |
2011-12 |
3,622.7 |
2012-13 |
3,757.74 |
2013-14 |
828.11 |
2014-15 |
2,451.85 |
2015-16 |
482.5 |
Beyond 2016 |
699 |
Total |
13,011.14 |
Key Issues and Road Ahead
22. Going forward, the issue in our context is not
really about the limited context of capital flows but a
more fundamental one of the capital account
management architecture which is responsive to the
needs of the real economy and maintaining financial
stability. The issue of opening up of the capital account
fully has become, so to speak, the last frontier in
reforming the financial sector. In some quarters, the
capital account constraint has come to be perceived as
impacting other elements, particularly the
development of markets. However, what such
arguments fail to recognise is that the macroeconomic
framework is an intricately inter-connected model with
several cross-impact elements. One can’t touch just one
element without disturbing some other.
23. It thus becomes necessary to progress with
liberalisation of different elements of the capital
account within the overall context. We have been
measuring our readiness in terms of certain metrics
but these have proved to be contextually variable. The
practical approach seems to be to move towards further
liberalisation but retain the broad principles of the
approach pursued hitherto. In this context, let me
touch upon the key issues in regard to major elements:
FDI Flows
- FDI contributes to stable growth through transfer,
diffusion and spill-over effects and it is considered
stable. Except for a few sectors, the policy is liberal
and investments can be made under the automatic
route. There have been some concerns on the
declining FDI flows in the recent past though, as
stated earlier, it has little to do with the regulatory
framework per se except in certain sectors. The
moderation in FDI inflows to India during April-
November 2010 has been driven by sectors such
as construction, mining and business services.
Certain structural factors, if addressed
expeditiously, could raise the share of India in
the projected FDI flows to EMEs in the near
future. According to the IIF, net FDI flows to EMEs
are forecast to increase by 11 per cent in 2011.
In this context, it may need to be recognised that
FEMA, in terms of its scope, is concerned only
with the transactions, both capital and current
account, and not with the economic activity per
se. FDI policy is not just a capital account issue
but is linked to Government’s regulatory policies
governing specific sectors that are much broader
in nature. This, too, needs to be addressed
appropriately.
Portfolio Flows
The Report of the Committee on Foreign
Investment has recommended introducing a
single channel of foreign investments, Qualified
Foreign Investors (QFI), for all foreign investors.
While the regulations for various channels is wellappreciated,
the Committee has suggested
opening up the QFI route to all foreign investors,
including individuals, subject to compliance with
know your costomer (KYC) requirements. The
issue here is not merely access to stock markets
but has much larger implications. In effect, it
would imply permitting all foreign residents to
open accounts in India for their transactions and permitting them access to other market segments
for their hedging requirements. The entire gamut
of ramifications needs to be thought through
carefully as this would result in full capital account
convertibiity.
Investments in Debt
-
The recent experience of many countries during
the crisis as well as the worsening external sector
ratios for India preclude any case for further
liberalising the debt route. However, one issue
that has been coming up regularly is that
permitting foreign investment in domesticcurrency
denominated debt securities poses much
less risks. While it is true that the currency risk
in this case would be borne by foreign investors
but it is equally true that the impact-risks of ‘floods
and droughts’ would be similar. In fact, this route
would provide a channel for taking currency views
as well. When currency risks are hedged, in effect
the currency risk is transferred to domestic
financial system/entities.
-
Having a dominant investor class in the short-term
segment, susceptible to sudden stops and
reversals, is clearly a risk from macreconomic
perspective. As illustrated by the Chart below, FIIs
have demonstrated a clear preference for shortterm
tenors, with 40 per cent each of the
investment in government and corporate debt in
tenors up to one year.
 |
- The time–honoured principles that underlie
opening up of debt markets to foreign investment
are convergence in nominal and real interest rates
on sustainable basis, low debt/GDP ratio and low
fiscal deficit to GDP ratios on a consistent basis.
In case of sovereign borrowing, given the huge
market borrowing requirements, there will be
increased susceptibility to global market
developments and rating changes if there is
increased participation of foreign investors. In the
recent market turmoil, while the private sector
did feel the adverse impact of worsening global
credit conditions, the sovereign borrowing
program was largely unaffected from direct impact
on this count.
Outflows
-
The regime for outward flows by individuals,
mutual funds as well as corporates, has been
significantly liberalised over the years. The most
visible manifestation of this policy has been the
increasing cross-border acquisitions by Indian
companies (Table 2).
-
Liberalising outward flows may not be a solution
to offset large portfolio inflows as is often
recommended. The modus operandi of overseas
acquisitions is to undertake acquisitions through
Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) overseas. The
funding is often arranged through overseas banks
backed either by shares or assets of the target
company and/or guarantees by the Indian parent.
The actual outflow in the form of equity and loans
is, therefore, not equivalent to the actual value of
the deals. Similarly, we have allowed mutual
funds to invest upto USD 8 billion overseas; only
around USD 1 billion of this limit has been used.
Such outflows may potentially take place at
inopportune times from a systemic perspective.
Table 4 : Outward FDI from India (USD Million) |
Year |
Equity |
Loan |
Guarantee Issued |
Total |
2007-08 |
11,291.92 |
2,718.88 |
6,959.97 |
20,970.76 |
2008-09 |
10,730.00 |
3,313.86 |
3,104.87 |
17,148.74 |
2009-10 |
6,738.85 |
3,627.19 |
7,603.79 |
17,969.83 |
2010-11 (till 17.02.2011) |
8,445.53 |
6,609.73 |
25,233.16 |
40,288.42 |
It thus becomes imperative from a financial
stability perspective to have some prudential
limits in place.
Access to Financial Markets
-
One of the key arguments favouring a more open
capital account has been the attendant benefits it
brings to the development of domestic markets.
It was believed that free capital flows into the
financial markets are necessary for efficient
allocation of resources and for completion of
markets by providing more liquidity. The potency
of this argument has at least partly been dented
by the crisis, which has demonstrated that pursuit
of development of financial markets per se cannot
be an end in itself.
-
However, trying to balance all objectives does
bring its own challenges for policymaking. It has
been argued that in today’s financial world of
complex derivatives, it is really not possible to
have restrictive policies for flow of capital. The
significant increase in the Non-Deliverable
Forwards (NDF) volumes involving Indian rupee
(INR) is a case in point. The recent Bank for
International Settlement (BIS) Triennial Survey
was pretty revealing in this regard. From a
regulatory perspective, the real issue is the impact
of this market on the onshore markets.
-
Our preliminary estimates have not been able to
establish a causal relationship between the NDF
and onshore markets but going by the experience
of other countries, the NDF market can indeed
be a source of vulnerability. It does raise certain
issues particularly regarding the nature of
operations of banks as well as corporates having
cross-border presence which may need to be
looked into. Recently, there were reports that
Korea has a similar audit of some overseas banks
over trading in currency derivatives which are
suspected of being ‘speculative moves’.
-
It is often suggested that the way to deal with the
NDF market is to bring it onshore. In other words
allow non-deliverable forwards in the Indian
market with free access to all non-residents which
have the same impact as full capital account convertibility. This would essentially imply
permitting non-residents access to domestic
markets irrespective of whether they have
underlying exposures to domestic markets or not.
In other words, allow them to trade foreign
exchange involving the rupee as a separate asset
class. This could, however, lead to excessive
volatility in foreign exchange markets. It also has
impact on other markets due to inter-linkages.
Such liberalisation makes domestic markets very
vulnerable to speculative attacks. Is this
opportune and advisable?
-
Another related issue is that of use of Rupee for
trade invoicing. It is argued that rupee invoicing
may be a preferred option to help domestic
exporters and importers to deal with currency
volatility. Even now, there are no regulatory
restrictions coming in its way. The issues are two
fold: first, the acceptability of rupee invoicing to
the overseas trade counterparty; and two, the
attractiveness of rupee for credit facilities.
Acceptability may be increased by devising a
mechanism to permit the overseas party to hedge
its rupee exposures onshore. The Reserve Bank
is willing to examine this and I would urge FEDAI
to come up with feasible suggestions in this
regard.
-
The guidelines on Credit Default Swap (CDS) will
be released shortly. One of the issues is the access
to this market for FIIs. The Reserve Bank is
examining the suggestion to allow them to hedge
the credit risk in India provided they have
invested in the underlying bonds.
Conclusion
24. The balance of costs and benefits of capital flows
for recipient countries has started getting reassessed
in the aftermath of the crisis. A similar reassessment
happened after the Asian crisis. Many studies have
since concluded that the cross-country evidence on the
growth benefits of capital account openness is
inconclusive and lacks robustness. The present crisis,
however, has led to a shift in the approach to capital
account from its narrow exchange rate implications and
management of capital flows is now accepted as a
legitimate instrument of growth, macroeconomic policy and financial stability. The role of forex reserves
in providing insurance is also recognised, particularly
since countries with large foreign exchange
reserves were better positioned to weather the liquidity
crisis.
25. India has now had some experience with the
above model of a framework and the way forward
seems to be continuing liberalisation within this
framework.
26. To conclude, I would like to flag a few issues from
a systemic perspective:
-
In an open economy like ours, there is need for
greater recognition of currency and interest rate
risks and strengthening the risk management
practices in banks as well as corporate firms. It is
our experience that a large number of corporates
still do not have well-designed risk management
policies and practices to take care of volatile
exchange rate movements and give scant regard
to tail risks. There is also need for greater
disclosure and adherence to accounting standards
for financial instruments.
-
There is also need to more comprehensively
qualitatively assess our external liabilities to also
encompass liabilities of subsidiaries and branches
of Indian financial institutions overseas, not in
nominal terms but through a risk-based approach
on the probability of recourse to parent bank
liquidity support.
-
Operations of foreign financial entities in
domestic markets also have implications on capital
account due to cross-border fund flow and
derivative positions. During the crisis period,
funds were held abroad temporarily to support
parent bank liquidity. In India. there are
prudential regulations on banks’ recourse to
overseas funding markets, including for foreign
banks. More local funding of local assets reduces
systemic risk and helps to curb excessive risk
taking and credit growth.
27. I hope that we will continue to have constructive
engagement with FEDAI and I wish the
Conference all success.
*Keynote Address by Smt. Shyamala Gopinath, Deputy Governor, Reserve
Bank of India at the Annual Conference of the Foreign Exchange Dealers’
Association of India (FEDAI) on February 18, 2011 at Thimpu.
2 ‘The Fund’s Role Regarding Cross-Border Capital Flows’, IMF, November,
2010.
3 Maurice Obstfeld, Jay C. Shambaugh and Alan M. Taylor (2009), Financial
Instability, Reserves, and Central Bank Swap Lines in the Panic of 2008,
NBER Working Paper No. 14826.
4 Jean-Louis Combes, Tidiane Kinda, and Patrick Plane: ‘Capital Flows,
Exchange Rate Flexibility, and the Real Exchange Rate’, IMF Working Paper,
2011. |